Principles of Economics, 7th Edition (MindTap Course List)
7th Edition
ISBN: 9781285165875
Author: N. Gregory Mankiw
Publisher: Cengage Learning
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Chapter 22, Problem 7PA
Subpart (a):
To determine
Applying Borda count and Arrow’s impossibility theorem.
Subpart (b):
To determine
Applying Borda count and Arrow’s impossibility theorem.
Subpart (c):
To determine
Applying Borda count and Arrow’s impossibility theorem.
Subpart (d):
To determine
Applying Borda count and Arrow’s impossibility theorem.
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Kimberly's sister would like to start a business with her brother selling simple T-shirts that are green in color at all stores in the area.
Her brother disagrees and thinks that the shirts should have a special logo on them and should be sold only at specific stores. As the
deciding vote, what should Kimberly choose and why?
Choose one:
A selling green T-shirts because prices will be higher as the number of stores increases
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OC. selling shirts with a special logo because prices will be higher as the shirts becomes more unique
OD. selling shirts with a special logo because prices will be higher as the shirts are sold in fewer stores
OE. both C and D
2
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Chapter 22 Solutions
Principles of Economics, 7th Edition (MindTap Course List)
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