Principles of Economics, 7th Edition (MindTap Course List)
7th Edition
ISBN: 9781285165875
Author: N. Gregory Mankiw
Publisher: Cengage Learning
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Chapter 22, Problem 5QCMC
To determine
The application ofMedian voter theorem.
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Two people will select a policy that affects both of them by applying a "veto" in a sequential and alternate manner, that is: person 1 begins to veto a policy and then person 2 exercises his "veto" with the remaining policies; the process repeats until only one policy remains.
Assume that there are 3 policies: X,Y,Z, and that person 1 prefers X to Y to Z and person 2 prefers Z to Y to X.
a. Represents the game extensively
b. Give the number of subgames
C. Indicate the total strategies of the players
d. find all subgame perfect nash equilibria
e. Find all Nash Equilibriums.
Chapter 22 Solutions
Principles of Economics, 7th Edition (MindTap Course List)
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- Ex. 4 Strength Can Be Weakness A three-person committee has to choose a winner for a prize. After some debate, there are three candidates still under consideration. Let's call these candidates a, b and c, and call those committee members 1, 2 and 3. The committee members only care about which candidate wins the prize, and their preferences as follows: member 1 prefers a to b and b to c; member 2 prefers c to a and a to b; and member 3 prefers b to c and c to a. The rules of the competition say that the committee should first apply majority vote (secret ballot, one member one vote) and the candidate with the most votes wins. If the vote is tied, that is, the majority rule select a unique winning candidate, then the winner will be the candidate for whom member 1 voted. Thus, it might seem that member 1 has an advantage. (1) Write down the strategic form of this voting game. [You may assign any number to the payoff of each voter, as long as it is consistent with her preference order.] (2)…arrow_forwardEx. 4 Strength Can Be Weakness A three-person committee has to choose a winner for a prize. After some debate, there are three candidates still under consideration. Let's call these candidates a, b and c, and call those committee members 1, 2 and 3. The committee members only care about which candidate wins the prize, and their preferences as follows: member 1 prefers a to b and b to c; member 2 prefers c to a and a to b; and member 3 prefers b to c and c to a. The rules of the competition say that the committee should first apply majority vote (secret ballot, one member one vote) and the candidate with the most votes wins. If the vote is tied, that is, the majority rule select a unique winning candidate, then the winner will be the candidate for whom member 1 voted. Thus, it might seem that member 1 has an advantage. (1) Write down the strategic form of this voting game. [You may assign any number to the payoff of each voter, as long as it is consistent with her preference order.] (2)…arrow_forwardThe following table shows the number of voters preferring various amounts of spending on a new school. Number of Voters 12 33 47 22 6 4 1 Select one: a. $0.5 b. $1.5 c. $2.0 d. $1.0 Preferred Spending (millions) $0.0 $0.5 $1.0 $1.5 $2.0 $2.5 $3.0 Refer to the table above. What is the preferred spending amount of the median voter?arrow_forward
- 2) What is straight-ticket voting? How does this help candidates in down ballot races?arrow_forwardBriefly explain why the principle that the majority of voters should decide an election outcome may not always make logical sense.arrow_forward_______ 5) One of the first steps in running for President is winning your local city election. ________ 6) Virginia holds the first state primary of the election season. _______ 7) In terms of people trying to influence the government, lobbyists have the most power.arrow_forward
- Elaboratearrow_forwardWhich of the following is true? a. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem states that There is no voting method that will satisfy a reasonable set of fairness criteria when there are three or candidates. b. Gibbard-Satterthwaite's theorem states that there is a voting method is completely resistant to strategic voting. c. None of the given choices d. May's Theorem states that the majority method will always have a winner.arrow_forward4.1. The vote-for-two method works as follows: Candidates get apoint whenever a voter ranks them first or second. The candidate withthe most points is declared to be the winner (or if several candidates tiefor the most points, they are all declared to be winners).(a) Does the vote-for-two method satisfy the Condorcet criterion?(b) Does the vote-for-two method satisfy the anti-Condorcet criterion?(c) Does the vote-for-two method satisfy the Pareto property?(d) Is the vote-for-two method independent?arrow_forward
- 1. Why is there a political divergence in the citizen-candidate model as opposed to Downsian electoral competition? Explain. 2. What is the difference between strategic and sincere voting? 3. Explain why multiple equilibriums occur in the citizen-candidate model?arrow_forwardPharrow_forward20. In which of the following types of political culture do citizens believe that the role of government is to protect and preserve the existing social order? a. Individualistic b. Traditionalistic c. Moralistic d. Socialistic e. Civicarrow_forward
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