Microeconomic Theory
12th Edition
ISBN: 9781337517942
Author: NICHOLSON
Publisher: Cengage
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Chapter 15, Problem 15.6P
b)
To determine
Upper bound on n is to be determined.
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Consider a market with an inverse demand Function p = 60 -4*Q. There are two firms, an
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