Concept explainers
a)
Profit maximizing price quantity combination and corresponding profits for the monopolist
a)
Explanation of Solution
Demand curve,
Therefore, profits are,
Differentiating the profit equation with respect to
Second order condition, proves that this price and quantity maximizes the profits for a monopolist.
And profits given this price and quantity is,
b)
Nash equilibrium output for two firms operating in Cournot model. Also to compute
market output, price and firms profits.
b)
Explanation of Solution
From the demand function, we get,
Also,
So, profit for the firm 1 ,
Differentiating with respect to
And similarly, profit equation of the firm 2 reveals,
Solving 1 and 2 we get,
Market output will be,
And market price is,
So, at
The profits for firm 1 is,
The profit for firm 2 is,
c)
To find Nash equilibrium prices in a Bertrand model. Also to compute firm output and profits as well as market output.
c)
Explanation of Solution
In case of a Bertrand model, undercutting of prices by both the firms leads to price becoming approximately nil in the given scenario. Hence the price will tend to zero, and quantity will become tending to 150 .
So, price
And Quantity
As there are no cost to production so firms will undercut to a level that at the end of the day both firms will be willing to provide the quantity at price 0 .
Profits for the firm
And market output is,
However the maximum demand is only for 150 units, therefore market output is 150 .
d)
To graph the demand curve for cases in parts (a), (b), (c).
d)
Explanation of Solution
In the above diagram, Price is measured on
In part
In part c, the two firms follows Bertand
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