2nd Edition

ISBN: 9781680920864

Author: Timothy Taylor, Steven A. Greenlaw, David Shapiro

Publisher: MCGRAW-HILL HIGHER EDUCATION

Textbook Question

Chapter 12, Problem 12SCQ

Consider the case of global environmental problems that spill across international borders as a prisoner’s dilemma of the sort studied in Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly. Say that there are two countries, A and B. Each country can cheese whether to protect the environment, at a cost of 10, or not to protect it, at a cost of zero. If one country decides to protect the environment, there is a benefit of 16, but the benefit is divided equally between the two countries. If both countries decide to protect the environment, there is a benefit of 32, which is divided equally between the two centuries.

In Table 12.10, fill in the costs, benefits, and total payoffs to the countries of the following decisions. Explain why, without some international agreement, they are likely to end up with neither country acting to protect the environment.

Chapter 12, Problem 12SCQ, Consider the case of global environmental problems that spill across international borders as a

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