You like your job, but your boss gives lousy bonuses. You were recently offered a new job with better rewaris and your friend wants to know if you intend to take it. You say. "It depends on whether the bonus this year is generous. Let's wait and see. We'l find out next week" The likely outcome of this game is your boss gives you a 3 bonus and you "you want to stay at your current job and be better rewarded, you could improve your strategy if you O demand an increase in your bonus by a certain amount, but does not tel your boss about the job offer. adopt a dominant strategy to accept the other posution and make this known to your boss. tell the boss about the job offer you are prepared to take f your bonus structure does not increase by a certain amount. adopt a dominant strategy to stay at your current position and make this known to your boss

You like your job, but your boss gives lousy bonuses. You were recently offered a new job with better rewaris and your friend wants to know if you intend to take it. You say. "It depends on whether the bonus this year is generous. Let's wait and see. We'l find out next week" The likely outcome of this game is your boss gives you a 3 bonus and you "you want to stay at your current job and be better rewarded, you could improve your strategy if you O demand an increase in your bonus by a certain amount, but does not tel your boss about the job offer. adopt a dominant strategy to accept the other posution and make this known to your boss. tell the boss about the job offer you are prepared to take f your bonus structure does not increase by a certain amount. adopt a dominant strategy to stay at your current position and make this known to your boss

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Three politicians are voting on whether to allow themselves a salary increase of$3,500per a year. If they vote in favor of a raise, then they lose some public support, costing them each$1,500 per year. The salary increase passes if two or more politicians vote in favor of it. What is this game’s Nash equilibrium (or equilibria)? Explain. There is no need to draw a payoff matrix.
Mohamed and Kate each pick an integer number between 1 and 3 (inclusive). They make their choices sequentially.Mohamed is the first player and Kate the second player. If they pick the same number each receives a payoff equal to the number they named. If they pick a different number, they get nothing. What is the SPE of the game? a. Mohamed chooses 3 and Kate is indifferent between 1, 2 and 3. b. Mohamed chooses 3 and Kate chooses 1 if Mohamed chooses 1, 2 if Mohamed chooses 2, and 3 if Mohamed chooses 3. c. Mohamed chooses 1 and Kate chooses 1 if Mohamed chooses 1, 2 if Mohamed chooses 2 and 3 if Mohamed chooses 3. d. Mohamed chooses 3 and Kate chooses 3.
So imagine you are playing this game as the second player and you are both given a 10 dollars and the dictator decides to offer you 25 cents and that she/he will keep $9.25. Your only choice is to accept the 25 cents or reject the offer and get no money at all. What would you do? What would be considered ‘rational’ from the perspective of utility maximization? What would you do if this is a continued game and the same scenario will happen multiple times not just once? Do you think others will react the same way you would?
Topic B Problem: Imagine you have two competing athletes who have the option to use an illegal and/or dangerous drug to enhance their performance (i.e., dope). If neither athlete dopes, then neither gains an advantage. If only one dopes, then that athlete gains a massive advantage over their competitor, reduced by the medical and legal risks of doping. However, if both athletes dope, the advantages cancel out, and only the risks remain, putting them both in a worse position than if neither had been doping. What class concept best describes this situation? Using this class concept, what outcome do we expect from these two athletes? Are there any factors that could change the outcome predicted by this course concept?
You are considering two options for your next family vacation. You can visit Disney World or Chicago. Your utility from Disney World is 100 if the weather is clear, and 0 if it rains. Chicago is worth a utility of 70 if the weather is clear and a utility of 40 if the weather is rainy. Also assume that the chance of rain at Disney World is going to be 50% and the chance of rain in Chicago is 40%. As a utility maximizer, should you plan to go to Disney World or Chicago? (Explain using relevant equations)
Burger King has introduced new strategy by reducing the price of its Whopper by 75 percent if customers also purchased french fries and a soft drink. Nevertheless, the sales dropped within two weeks. Based on your knowledge on game theory, what do you think had happened? The Edge magazine columnist, Jack Sparrow reported the recent findings of two academic political scientists. These scholars found out that voters are not happy with “negative campaigns” of politicians. However, the political scientists suggested it is pointless for candidates to stay positive. The damage from staying positive is heaviest when the opponent is attacking. Explain the dilemma. Airlines practice price discrimination by charging leisure travelers and business travelers different prices. Why do you think by charging different prices; the airline companies will maximize their profits? Discuss briefly.
After graduation, you face a choice. You can work for a multinational consulting firm and earn a starting salary (including benefits) of $45,000, or you can start your own consulting firm using $6,000 of your own savings. If you keep your money in a savings account, you can earn an interest rate of 5 percent. You choose to start your own consulting firm. At the end of the first year, you add up all of your expenses and revenues. Your expenses include $14,000 for rent, $1,600 for office supplies, $22,000 for labor, and $4,900 for telephone expenses. After operating your consulting firm for a year, your total revenues are $102,000. Instructions: Enter your answers as a whole number. a. What is your accounting profit? $ 44,500 8 b. What is your economic profit? $ 4,150
Suppose a company is hiring graduates from Harvard and Yale and they want to hire people with very high predicted productivity. All they use to predict productivity is where they went to school and their GPA. There is no difference in average true ability between students at Harvard and Yale. However, while Yale GPAs are excellent predictors of performance at this company, Harvard GPAs are not. The company hires very few graduates and the cutoff for expected productivity is well above average. What will be true about the GPA cutoffs for the two schools? A. The cutoff for Harvard will be higher.B. The cutoff for Yale will be higher.C. The cutoffs will be the same.D. There is not enough information to answer this question.
6. Eventually, Aron and Nora who we met in the previous problem were able to get together and have now been an item for some time. So long, in fact, that there are issues. Aron is a little insecure, which makes him jealous. Nora is none too pleased about it. When she arranges a girls' night out with some of her friends, Aron is very upset and threatens to break up. So Nora has to decide to go out with her friends or stay home with Aron. If she stays home, she gets a payoff of 0, whereas Aron gets what he wants and a payoff of 2 (perhaps he should be a little more concerned with Nora's happiness). On the other hand, if Nora decides to go out, then Aron must make a choice between breaking up or not. If he breaks up, both he and Nora are miserable and each receives a payoff of -1. If he does not, he gets a payoff of 1 while Nora gets what she wants and a payoff of 2. a) Draw the extensive form of this game. b) Find all Nash equilibria. Explain your answer carefully. c) Find the backward…
Suppose that Lionel Messi is negotiating a contract with FC Barcelona. Messi has an offer from Real Madrid for $20 million a year. If he signs with FC Barcelona, they will earn $90 million in revenue from the signing. FC Barcelona's next best option is to sign Cristiano Ronaldo. They would earn $70 million from signing Ronaldo and would pay him a contract of $10 million. Messi's bargaining power is w = 1/2. a) What is the negotiated salary between Messi and FC Barcelona under Nash Bargaining? What is Messi's surplus and what is FČ Barcelona's surplus? b) Due to an injury, FC Barcelona would only earn $50 million from signing Ronaldo but everything else remains the same. What is the negotiated salary between Messi and FC Barcelona under Nash Bargaining? What is Messi's surplus and what is FC Barcelona's surplus?
We have a group of three friends: Kramer, Jerry and Elaine. Kramer has a $10 banknote that he will auction off, and Jerry and Elaine will be bidding for it. Jerry and Elaine have to submit their bids to Kramer privately, both at the same time. We assume that both Jerry and Elaine only have $2 that day, and the available strategies to each one of them are to bid either$0, $1 or $2. Whoever places the highest bid, wins the $10 banknote. In case of a tie (that is, if Jerry and Elaine submit the same bid), each one of them gets $5. Regardless of who wins the auction, each bidder has to pay to Kramer whatever he or she bid. Does Jerry have any strictly dominant strategy? Does Elaine?
Economics Two players are bargaining over a three period bargaining model as discussed in class with player 1 making offers in rounds 1 and 3. Player 2 makes an offer in round 2 only. Each player has a common discount factor delta. The two players are bargaining to split $20. They have three time periods available to them for their bargaining game. At the end of round 3, if no agreement has been reached then player 1 receives $2 and player 2 receives $1 and the rest of the money is destroyed. Find the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome in the finite horizon model in which the game ends after period 3.