Player 1 has two options: L and R. If Player 1 chooses L, then Player 2 has two options; she can choose A or B. If Player 2 chooses A payoffs are (2; 1) and if she chooses B payoffs are (1; 2). If Player 1 chooses R, then Player 2 has two options; she can choose Y or N. If Player 2 shows Y payoffs are (0; 3) and if she chooses N payoffs are (1; 2). Which of the following statements is true? O A. (L; B,Y ) is a subgame perfect equilibrium of this game O B. (R; B,N ) is a subgame perfect equilibrium of this game O C (L; A,Y ) is a subgame perfect equilibrium of this game O D. (R; B,Y ) is a subgame perfect equilibrium of this game

Player 1 has two options: L and R. If Player 1 chooses L, then Player 2 has two options; she can choose A or B. If Player 2 chooses A payoffs are (2; 1) and if she chooses B payoffs are (1; 2). If Player 1 chooses R, then Player 2 has two options; she can choose Y or N. If Player 2 shows Y payoffs are (0; 3) and if she chooses N payoffs are (1; 2). Which of the following statements is true? O A. (L; B,Y ) is a subgame perfect equilibrium of this game O B. (R; B,N ) is a subgame perfect equilibrium of this game O C (L; A,Y ) is a subgame perfect equilibrium of this game O D. (R; B,Y ) is a subgame perfect equilibrium of this game

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

Which one is the best strategy for Player 1? Player 1 (10, 20) Leave Leave Cooperate Stay Cooperate Player2 Not cooperate Stay (15, 14) Not cooperate Leave Player 2 (17, 11) Stay (16, 12)
Player 1 Cooperate (C) Defect (D) If the game has a dominant strategy, what is it? There is none. If the game has a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, what is it? There is none. Cooperate (C) 3,3 8,0 Cooperate (C) is a dominant strategy for both players. Defect (D) is a dominant strategy for both players. Cooperate (C) is a dominant strategy for 1, and Defect (D) is a dominant strategy for 2. C, C is the only Nash equilibrium. D, D is the only Nash equilibrium. C, C and D, D are both Nash equilibria. Player 2 Defect (D) 0,8 1,1
Jane is interested in buying a car from a used car dealer. Her maximum willingness to pay for thecar is 12 ($12,000). Bo, the dealer, is willing to sell the car as long as he receives at least 9($9,000). What is the Nash bargaining solution to this game?
Player 1 and Player 2 will play one round of the Rock-Paper-Scissors game. The winner receives a payoff +1, the loser receives a payoff -1. If it is a tie, then each player receives a payoff zero. Suppose Player 2 is using a non-optimal strategy: he/she plays Rock with probability 35%; Paper with probability 45%; and Scissors with probability 20%. Given that Player 1 knows Player 2 is using this strategy, the best response of Player 1 is to play O a mixed strategy with probability 1/3 each (Rock, Paper and Scissors) O Scissors with probability 100% O any strategy (any strategy is a best response for Player 1) O Rock with probability 100% O Paper with probability 100%
1
3. Two individuals are involved in a synergistic relationship. If both individuals devote more effort to the relationship, they are both better off. Specifically, an effort level is a nonnegative number, and player 1's payoff function is e₁(1+€₂-e₁), where ei is player i's effort level. For player 2 the cost of effort is either the same as that of player 1, and hence her payoff function is given by e2(1+e₁ - e₂), or effort is very costly for her in which case her payoff function is given by e₂(1 + e₁ — 2e2). 1 Player 2 knows player 1's payoff function and whether the cost of effort is high for herself or not. Player 1, however, is uncertain about player 2's cost of effort. He believes that the cost of effort is low with probability p, and high with probability 1 - p, where 0 < p < 1. Find the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game as a function of p.
fast i will 10 upvotes
the Consider a simultaneous-move integer game between two players: Marilyn and Noah. Each of player is required to announce a positive integer between 1 to 4. In other words, a player can announce 1, 2, 3, or 4. Two players announce their integers simultaneously. Notice that this game is different from the games we learned in class in that each player has four actions to take. The payoffs of the players in the game are specified as follows: (1) when the two announced integers are different, whoever reports the lower number pays $1 to the other player, so that the loser of the game has payoff -1 and the winner of the game has payoff 1; (2) when the two players announce the same integer, their payoffs are both O. What is Marilyn's maximin strategy? 01 02 03 O
7
A and B are a couple and they want to go into a concert. A comes from Bonn and loves the music of Ludwig van Beethoven. B comes from Salzburg and loves the music of Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart. There are two concerts in town: one with the music of Beethoven and one with the music of Mozart. Both (A and B) prefer to go to a concert together. If both go to a concert of Beethoven, A has a pay-off of 4 and B has a pay-off of 2. If both go to a concert of Mozart, B has a pay-off of 4 and A has a pay-off of 2. If A goes to a concert of Mozart and B to a concert of Beethoven, they are both miserable and get a pay-off of 0. But, if B goes to a concert of Mozart and A to a concert of Beethoven, they are both a little better off with a pay-off of 1. Both A and B have to make a simultaneous decision and cannot communicate prior to the decision. (a) Construct the pay-off matrix for this game. (b) Identify the Nash equilibrium or equilibria of the game. (c) Which off the allocations are…
Mixed Nash Equilibrium Player 2 C D A 5,1 1,3 B 2,6 4,2 PLAYER 1 a) calculate the probability In equilibrium Player 1 chooses A with probability a= [?] and player 2 chooses M with probability B = [ ?] b) calculate payoff for mixed strategy nash equilibrium Player 1 gets payoff of [?] Player 2 gets payoff of [?] c) Suppose the payoff for (B,C) would change to (0,8) Would probability a increase,decrease, stay the same? Would probability B increase,decrease, stay the same?
Player 2 Left Center 30, 40 6, 20 20, 20 Right 21, 24 32, 35 10, 5 Up Middle 5, 5 40, 11 Player 1 Down 38, 42 Use the information in the game matrix above to answer questions #3 and # 4. 3. If both Players move simultaneously, then a. Player 1 has a dominant strategy, and Player 2 does not. b. Player 2 has a dominant strategy, and Player 1 does not. c. There is more than one pure strategy Nash Equilibrium. d. Both players have a dominant strategy. e. There are no Nash Equilibria in pure strategies. 4. If Player 1 moves first, then is the subgame perfect equilibrium. a. (Up, Left) b. (Middle, Center) c. (Middle, Right) d. (Down, Left) e. (Down, Center)