E 11 Continue to maximize profit (0,80) Stay out Fight entry Enter 12 (0, 10) Continue to maximize profit (30, 50) ($millions entrant's profit, Smillions incumbent's profit) In the sequential game shown above, "E" represents the potential entrant firm, and "I" represents the incumbent firm. Firm need to decide whether to enter the market or "stay out". If E stays out, the incumbent is at decision node 11 and simply continues business as usual. If firm E enters, firm I is in decision node 12 and needs to decide whether to "fight entry" or "continue". Payoffs are given in parentheses, with the first term for form E and the second term for firm I. What is the backward induction equilibrium of this game? None of the above are correct. E: Enters; I: (Fights at 11, Fights at 12) E: Stays Out; I: (Continues at 11, Fights at 12) E: Enters; I: (Continues at 11, Continues at 12) E: Stays Out; I: (Continues at 11, Continues at 12)

E 11 Continue to maximize profit (0,80) Stay out Fight entry Enter 12 (0, 10) Continue to maximize profit (30, 50) ($millions entrant's profit, Smillions incumbent's profit) In the sequential game shown above, "E" represents the potential entrant firm, and "I" represents the incumbent firm. Firm need to decide whether to enter the market or "stay out". If E stays out, the incumbent is at decision node 11 and simply continues business as usual. If firm E enters, firm I is in decision node 12 and needs to decide whether to "fight entry" or "continue". Payoffs are given in parentheses, with the first term for form E and the second term for firm I. What is the backward induction equilibrium of this game? None of the above are correct. E: Enters; I: (Fights at 11, Fights at 12) E: Stays Out; I: (Continues at 11, Fights at 12) E: Enters; I: (Continues at 11, Continues at 12) E: Stays Out; I: (Continues at 11, Continues at 12)

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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