You are evaluating a loan request of $3.5 million from Precise Corp and the bank will require an expected return of 4.0 percent per annum. The firm has an existing debt repayment obligation of $4.5 million. It has $2.0 million in equity. The firm has two projects, A and B. An investment in A will yield a payoff of $5.5 million with a probability of 0.8 and $3.0 million with a probability of 0.2. An investment in B will yield a payoff of $8.0 million with a probability of 0.4 and $0.5 million with a probability of 0.6. The firm has assets-in-place that generates $5.0 million with a probability of 0.75 and $1.0 million with a probability of 0.25. Assume that the distributions of payoffs for A and B are common knowledge, and the payoff from A is statistically independent of the payoff for B. However, as a bank officer, you cannot observe the firm's project choice. What rate should the bank charge in order to breakeven? Given this rate will a Nash equilibrium result?
You are evaluating a loan request of $3.5 million from Precise Corp and the bank will require an expected return of 4.0 percent per annum. The firm has an existing debt repayment obligation of $4.5 million. It has $2.0 million in equity. The firm has two projects, A and B. An investment in A will yield a payoff of $5.5 million with a probability of 0.8 and $3.0 million with a probability of 0.2. An investment in B will yield a payoff of $8.0 million with a probability of 0.4 and $0.5 million with a probability of 0.6. The firm has assets-in-place that generates $5.0 million with a probability of 0.75 and $1.0 million with a probability of 0.25. Assume that the distributions of payoffs for A and B are common knowledge, and the payoff from A is statistically independent of the payoff for B. However, as a bank officer, you cannot observe the firm's project choice. What rate should the bank charge in order to breakeven? Given this rate will a Nash equilibrium result?
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1QTC
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Question
![You are evaluating a loan request of $3.5
million from Precise Corp and the bank will
require an expected return of 4.0 percent per
annum. The firm has an existing debt
repayment obligation of $4.5 million. It has
$2.0 million in equity. The firm has two
projects, A and B. An investment in A will yield
a payoff of $5.5 million with a probability of
0.8 and $3.0 million with a probability of O.2.
An investment in B will yield a payoff of $8.0
million with a probability of 0.4 and $0.5
million with a probability of 0.6. The firm has
assets-in-place that generates $5.0 million
with a probability of 0.75 and $1.0 million with
a probability of 0.25. Assume that the
distributions of payoffs for A and B are
common knowledge, and the payoff from A is
statistically independent of the payoff for B.
However, as a bank officer, you cannot
observe the firm's project choice.
What rate should the bank charge in order to
breakeven? Given this rate will a Nash
equilibrium result?](/v2/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcontent.bartleby.com%2Fqna-images%2Fquestion%2Fbb323cca-c282-4e79-8f64-fe8c0eabfe9a%2F7a567ab1-1c34-4d1f-85e7-3225c95a7708%2F8sbyym_processed.jpeg&w=3840&q=75)
Transcribed Image Text:You are evaluating a loan request of $3.5
million from Precise Corp and the bank will
require an expected return of 4.0 percent per
annum. The firm has an existing debt
repayment obligation of $4.5 million. It has
$2.0 million in equity. The firm has two
projects, A and B. An investment in A will yield
a payoff of $5.5 million with a probability of
0.8 and $3.0 million with a probability of O.2.
An investment in B will yield a payoff of $8.0
million with a probability of 0.4 and $0.5
million with a probability of 0.6. The firm has
assets-in-place that generates $5.0 million
with a probability of 0.75 and $1.0 million with
a probability of 0.25. Assume that the
distributions of payoffs for A and B are
common knowledge, and the payoff from A is
statistically independent of the payoff for B.
However, as a bank officer, you cannot
observe the firm's project choice.
What rate should the bank charge in order to
breakeven? Given this rate will a Nash
equilibrium result?
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