Consider an economy with three dates (T-0, 1, 2) and the following investment opportunity. If an agent invests $1 in a project at T-0, the project yields $4 at T=2. The project can be liquidated at T=1 but early liquidation yields $1 at T=1. An agent has $1 and is risk averse and can be of two types. With probability 0.2 an agent is a type-1 consumer and with probability 0.8 an agent is a type-2 consumer. If an agent is a typel-consumer, he only values consumption at T=1 and his utility function is Hy = 2 –- where c, is the amount consumed at T=1. If an agent is a type-2 consumer, he values consumption at both T=1 and T=2 according to the utility function Hz = 2- C1 +C2 where C, and C2 are the amounts consumed at T=1 and T=2, respectively. a) What is the expected utility of the agent? Now consider a bank that invests in these projects. There are N=1,000 agents. All agents are identical ex ante in the above sense. Suppose they all deposit $1 each with the bank. The bank offers the following demand deposit contract (d1, d2) where d, is the amount and agent can withdraw at T=1 and d, is the amount he can withdraw at T=2. b) Suppose d-1.2. What is the amount d2 that the bank can offer an agent who withdraws at T=2? What is the expected utility of an agent? c) Suppose d2-3.6. What is the amount dl that the bank can offer an agent who withdraws at T=1? What is the expected utility of an agent?
Consider an economy with three dates (T-0, 1, 2) and the following investment opportunity. If an agent invests $1 in a project at T-0, the project yields $4 at T=2. The project can be liquidated at T=1 but early liquidation yields $1 at T=1. An agent has $1 and is risk averse and can be of two types. With probability 0.2 an agent is a type-1 consumer and with probability 0.8 an agent is a type-2 consumer. If an agent is a typel-consumer, he only values consumption at T=1 and his utility function is Hy = 2 –- where c, is the amount consumed at T=1. If an agent is a type-2 consumer, he values consumption at both T=1 and T=2 according to the utility function Hz = 2- C1 +C2 where C, and C2 are the amounts consumed at T=1 and T=2, respectively. a) What is the expected utility of the agent? Now consider a bank that invests in these projects. There are N=1,000 agents. All agents are identical ex ante in the above sense. Suppose they all deposit $1 each with the bank. The bank offers the following demand deposit contract (d1, d2) where d, is the amount and agent can withdraw at T=1 and d, is the amount he can withdraw at T=2. b) Suppose d-1.2. What is the amount d2 that the bank can offer an agent who withdraws at T=2? What is the expected utility of an agent? c) Suppose d2-3.6. What is the amount dl that the bank can offer an agent who withdraws at T=1? What is the expected utility of an agent?
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1QTC
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Question
![Question 1
Consider an economy with three dates (T-0, 1, 2) and the following investment opportunity. If
an agent invests $1 in a project at T-0, the project yields $4 at T=2. The project can be liquidated
at T=1 but early liquidation yields $1 at T-1.
An agent has $1 and is risk averse and can be of two types. With probability 0.2 an agent is a
type-1 consumer and with probability 0.8 an agent is a type-2 consumer.
If an agent is a typel-consumer, he only values consumption at T=1 and his utility function is
Hi = 2 --
where c, is the amount consumed at T=1. If an agent is a type-2 consumer, he values
consumption at both T=1 and T=2 according to the utility function
Hz = 2 –
C1 +C2
where C, and C2 are the amounts consumed at T=1 and T=2, respectively.
a)
What is the expected utility of the agent?
Now consider a bank that invests in these projects. There are N=1,000 agents. All agents are
identical ex ante in the above sense. Suppose they all deposit $1 each with the bank. The bank
offers the following demand deposit contract (d1, d2) where d, is the amount and agent can
withdraw at T=1 and d, is the amount he can withdraw at T-2.
b)
Suppose d1-1.2. What is the amount dz that the bank can offer an agent who withdraws at
T=2? What is the expected utility of an agent?
c)
Suppose d2-3.6. What is the amount d1 that the bank can offer an agent who withdraws at
T=1? What is the expected utility of an agent?
Suppose the bank offers (d1, dz)= (1.4, 3.6). An agent expects that M-630 other agents will
withdraw at T=1.
d)
What is the best response of the type-2 consumer, i.e. does he has an incentive to run to the
bank and withdraw at T=1?
What is the maximum number of withdrawals at T=1 such that a type-2 consumer has no
e)
incentive to withdraw at T=1.](/v2/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcontent.bartleby.com%2Fqna-images%2Fquestion%2F9e2597a6-f559-4086-95a9-d32d556d6ca5%2F6093b539-c989-4576-918f-660d3cd7a502%2Fe7y2dor_processed.jpeg&w=3840&q=75)
Transcribed Image Text:Question 1
Consider an economy with three dates (T-0, 1, 2) and the following investment opportunity. If
an agent invests $1 in a project at T-0, the project yields $4 at T=2. The project can be liquidated
at T=1 but early liquidation yields $1 at T-1.
An agent has $1 and is risk averse and can be of two types. With probability 0.2 an agent is a
type-1 consumer and with probability 0.8 an agent is a type-2 consumer.
If an agent is a typel-consumer, he only values consumption at T=1 and his utility function is
Hi = 2 --
where c, is the amount consumed at T=1. If an agent is a type-2 consumer, he values
consumption at both T=1 and T=2 according to the utility function
Hz = 2 –
C1 +C2
where C, and C2 are the amounts consumed at T=1 and T=2, respectively.
a)
What is the expected utility of the agent?
Now consider a bank that invests in these projects. There are N=1,000 agents. All agents are
identical ex ante in the above sense. Suppose they all deposit $1 each with the bank. The bank
offers the following demand deposit contract (d1, d2) where d, is the amount and agent can
withdraw at T=1 and d, is the amount he can withdraw at T-2.
b)
Suppose d1-1.2. What is the amount dz that the bank can offer an agent who withdraws at
T=2? What is the expected utility of an agent?
c)
Suppose d2-3.6. What is the amount d1 that the bank can offer an agent who withdraws at
T=1? What is the expected utility of an agent?
Suppose the bank offers (d1, dz)= (1.4, 3.6). An agent expects that M-630 other agents will
withdraw at T=1.
d)
What is the best response of the type-2 consumer, i.e. does he has an incentive to run to the
bank and withdraw at T=1?
What is the maximum number of withdrawals at T=1 such that a type-2 consumer has no
e)
incentive to withdraw at T=1.
Expert Solution
![](/static/compass_v2/shared-icons/check-mark.png)
Step 1
Given:
time periods - 0,1,2
If invests $1 in T=0, it becomes $4 in T=2 but in T=1 liquidated at $1
For type 1 probability, p1=0.2
For type 2 probability, p2=0.8
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