(Use for questions 1 - 3): Two soap producers, the Fortnum Company and the Maison Company,The payoff matrix (profit in millions of dollars) is as follows:can stress either newspapers or magazines in their forthcoming advertising campaigns.Maison CompanyStress NewspapersStress MagazinesМ, S9MF, S8MM, $8MF, $7MStress NewspapersFortnum CompanyМ, S8MF, $9MМ, $7MF, $8MStress MagazinesWhat will be the profit of each firm?a. Maison Newspapers, Fortnum Newspapers: M, $9M and F, $8MD. Maison Newspapers Fortnum Magazines:M, $8M and F, $9MC.Maison Magazines, Fortnum Newspapers: M, $8M and F, $7MM, $7M and F, $8MMaison Magazines, Fortnum Magazines:

The payoff matric is given below:

Answered: (Use for questions 1 - 3): Two soap…

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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5. Two firms compete repeatedly in a market of homogeneous goods. Each year, the firms can choose to charge a low or high price. The following payoff table summarizes their payoffs each year. The competition goes on indefinitely. Let 5 E (0, 1) denote the discount factor for both firms. Firm 2 Low High Low 0, 0 5, 0 Firm 1 High 0, 5 4, 4 Consider an n-period punishment trigger strategy s: • Play "High price" in the first stage. • In stage t> 2, if some player deviated to "Low price" in the last period when he is supposed to play "High price", then play "Low price" for n periods and then restart the game. In other words, after playing "Low price" for n periods, play "High price" in the next stage as if it is the first stage of the game. Otherwise, play "High price". Find the necessary and sufficient condition on & for (s, s) to be an SPE. A sufficiently simplified inequality will do.
Game theory - please help. Thanks!
here are two firms in the market, Pepsi and Coke. Strategies: Low price (price promotion, LP), Medium price (regular price, RP), high price (new price strategy, HP). Payoffs: Coke, Pepsi’s Net Profits; LP, LP: $1.4m, $1.2m; LP, RP: $3.1m, $0.6m; LP, HP: $3.9m, -$1.3m. RP, LP: $1.3m, $1.8m; RP, RP: $2.0m, $1.8m; RP, HP: $4.3m, $-0.3m. HP, LP: -$1.2m, $3.6m; HP, RP: $0.8m, $3.9m; HP, HP: $2.8m, $2.5m. In this game, the NE is (are): (HP, HP) (LP, LP) and (HP, HP) (LP, LP) There is no NE in this game (RP, RP)
AP CollegeBoard Test Booklet Unit 4 Problem Set Include correctly labeled diagrams, if useful or required, in explaining your answers. A correctly labeled diagram must have all axes and curves clearly labeled and must show directional changes. If the question prompts you to “Calculate," you must show how you arrived at your final answer. Use the graph provided below to answer parts (a)-(e). Marginal Cost Average Total Cost Average Variable Cost 108 100 55 Demand 0 10 21 31 44 57 77 Quantity Marginal Revenue BigMed, a profit-maximizing firm, has a patent on a medical device, making it the only producer of that device. The graph above shows BigMed's demand, marginal revenue, average total cost, average variable cost, and marginal cost curves. (a) Calculate BigMed's total revenue if the firm produces the allocatively efficient quantity. Show your work. (b) Starting at a price of $100, if BigMed were to increase the price by 2%, will the quantity demanded decrease by more than 2%, by less…
To advertise or not to advertise Suppose that Creamland and Dairy King are the only two firms that sell ice cream. The following payoff matrix shows the profit (in millions of dollars) each company will earn depending on whether or not it advertises: Dairy King Advertise Doesn't Advertise Creamland Advertise 10, 10 18, 2 Doesn't Advertise 2, 18 11, 11 For example, the upper right cell shows that if Creamland advertises and Dairy King doesn't advertise, Creamland will make a profit of $18 million, and Dairy King will make a profit of $2 million. Assume this is a simultaneous game and that Creamland and Dairy King are both profit-maximizing firms. If Creamland decides to advertise, it will earn a profit of _________ million if Dairy King advertises and a profit of ________ million if Dairy King does not advertise. If Creamland decides not to advertise, it will earn a profit of __________ million if Dairy King advertises and a profit of _________…
(REAL-WORLD APPLICATION) You are NOT required to read the oligopoly chapter in the textbook, but you already know quite a lot about it from our discussion of strategic interactions using game theory in weeks 2-3. This market structure is between monopoly and monopolistic competition, with only a handful of firms having a high degree of market power. Let's refresh your memory with the following example. Assume that the Australian low-cost airline industry consists of two firms and their situation can be represented by the following payoff matrix. Tigar Air Nothing Low Price More Advertising 0, 16 6, 6 Nothing 10, 10 2, 14 Jetstar Low Price 16, 0 12, 4 More Advertising 14, 2 4, 12 8, 8 a. Before solving the game, put yourself in the position of Jetstar and write down your action. Then independent of that, put yourself in the position of Tiger Air and write down your action. b. State all the dominated strategies in the full game, by which strategy they are dominated, and whether weakly or…
The table below shows market share data for different firms producing desks. Market Share in % 15 18 7 11 6 10 4 5 5 16 Firm Aardvark Inc Baluga, LLC Cran Inc Delta Co Echo Co Farriss Co Gum Drop Inc Hill Corp Indigo Corp Jackson Co What is the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) for this market? ← HHI 225 324 49 121 36 100 16 25 25 256 Suppose that Delta Co and Gum Drop Inc are considering a merger. What will the HHI be after this merger?
11. Suppose there is a duopoly of two identical firms, A and B, facing a market inverse demand of P = 140 – 0.5Q, and cost functions of CA = 20QA and Cg = 20QB respectively. a. Find the Cournot-Nash equilibrium and profit for each firm. b. Suppose that A acts as the leader in a Stackelberg model and B responds. What are the respective quantities and profits of each firm now? Is it advantageous to move first? c. If the firms were able to collude, how much additional profit could they earn if they switch from simple single pricing to perfect price discrimination? d. Graph and label equilibria on the inverse demand.
Suppose that GE is trying to prevent Maytag from entering the market for high efficiency clothes dryers. Even though high efficiency dryers are more costly to produce, they are also more profitable as they command sufficiently higher prices from consumers. The following payoffs table shows the annual profits for GE and Maytag for the advertising spending and entry decisions that they are facing. GE MAYTAG Advertising = $12m Advertising = $0.7m Stay Out $0, $30m $0, $35m Enter $1m , $20m $12m, $15 Based on this information, can GE successfully prevent Maytag from entering this market by increasing its advertising levels? What is the equilibrium outcome in this game? Suppose that an analyst at GE is convinced that just a little bit more advertising by GE, say another $2m, would be sufficient to deter enough customers from buying Maytag, thus, yield less than $0 profits for Maytag in the event it enters. Suppose that spending an extra $2m on advertising…
15. Match the description provided in the bank of options with the appropriate concept in the second table. Bank of options Letter A Consumers agree X is prefered to Y when both have equal prices Consumer preferences are changed Consumers obtain more information about product characteristics Consumers are targeted with advertising Characteristic that is consumed as complementary to product itself One time cost to enter an industry changes when the market size increases A firm that is a leader obtains a higher profit in a dynamic game One time cost to enter an industry is treated as a parameter of model A firm that is a follower obtains a higher profit in a dynamic game Consumers do not agree X is prefered to Y when both have equal prices Industry with monopoly and perfect competition characteristics An empirical model used to estimate product differentiation В C E F G H I J K Concept Second mover advantage First mover advantage Vertical product differentiation Horizontal product…

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