Two workers independently choose how much effort to put in their jobs. If worker 1 choosese₁ ≥ 0 and worker 2 chooses e2 ≥ 0, their payoffs are given byu₁(e₁,e2,01,02) = 0₁e₁ + ße₁e₂ ·- 1/²u₁ (e₁,e₂,0₁,0₂) = 0₂ €₂ + ßе₁e₂. = ²2where 0 <ß < 1 and 0 ≤ 0; ≤ 1 for i:=1,2. Assume that 0; is player i's private information: each playerknows her own 0 and believes that the other player's 0 is drawn from the uniform distribution over [0, 1].Find the Bayesian Nash equilibria of this game.

Two workers independently choosing the level of effort to put in , so as to maximize payoffs take…

Two workers independently choose how much effort to put in their jobs. If worker 1 chooses e₁ ≥ 0 and worker 2 chooses e₂ ≥ 0, their payoffs are given by u₁(e1, €2,01,02) = 0101 + ße1e2− −e² 2 u₁(e₁, €2,01,0₂) = 0₂e2+ Be₁ €2-1/2e2²2 where 0 <ß < 1 and 0 ≤ 0; ≤ 1 for i = 1,2. Assume that 0; is player i̇'s private information: each player knows her own and believes that the other player's is drawn from the uniform distribution over [0, 1]. Find the Bayesian Nash equilibria of this game

Two workers independently choose how much effort to put in their jobs. If worker 1 chooses e₁ ≥ 0 and worker 2 chooses e₂ ≥ 0, their payoffs are given by u₁(e1, €2,01,02) = 0101 + ße1e2− −e² 2 u₁(e₁, €2,01,0₂) = 0₂e2+ Be₁ €2-1/2e2²2 where 0 <ß < 1 and 0 ≤ 0; ≤ 1 for i = 1,2. Assume that 0; is player i̇'s private information: each player knows her own and believes that the other player's is drawn from the uniform distribution over [0, 1]. Find the Bayesian Nash equilibria of this game

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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