Answered: Consider that P1 may be either of type…

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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$Consider that P1 may be either of type H or of type L. If his type is H the players' payoffs for any action profile are given by the matrix above. If his type is L they are given by the matrix below. \table[[\table[[L P2 C R L L 3,0 1,2 2,1 P1 C 2,1 3,0 2,1 R 2,1 1,2 3,0 Consider that P1 may be either of type H or of type L. If his type is H the players' payoffs for any action profile are given by the matrix above. If his type is L they are given by the matrix below. P2 с L 3/2,3/2 1,2 L P1 C 2,1 3/2,3/2 R 3/2,3/2 1,2 #R 3/2,3/2 2,1 3/2,3/2 The type of P1 is known only to him. P2 believes that P1 is L with probability 99/100 and of type h with probability 1/100. Find the Bayes Nash Equilibrium of the game.$

Transcribed Image Text:Consider that P1 may be either of type H or of type L. If his type is H the players' payoffs for any action profile are given by the matrix above. If his type is L they are given by the matrix below. \table[[\table[[L P2 C R L L 3,0 1,2 2,1 P1 C 2,1 3,0 2,1 R 2,1 1,2 3,0 Consider that P1 may be either of type H or of type L. If his type is H the players' payoffs for any action profile are given by the matrix above. If his type is L they are given by the matrix below. P2 с L 3/2,3/2 1,2 L P1 C 2,1 3/2,3/2 R 3/2,3/2 1,2 #R 3/2,3/2 2,1 3/2,3/2 The type of P1 is known only to him. P2 believes that P1 is L with probability 99/100 and of type h with probability 1/100. Find the Bayes Nash Equilibrium of the game.

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