Two firms compete as a Stackelberg duopoly. The demand they face is P = 402 - Q. The cost function for firm 1 (the leader) is Ci(Q) = 201, and the cost function for firm 2 (the follower) is C2(Q2) = 6Q2 The profits earned by the firms are Multiple Choice A1 $20,806 and a2 $9,991. #1 $20.402 and a2= $9.409

Two firms compete as a Stackelberg duopoly. The demand they face is P = 402 - Q. The cost function for firm 1 (the leader) is Ci(Q) = 201, and the cost function for firm 2 (the follower) is C2(Q2) = 6Q2 The profits earned by the firms are Multiple Choice A1 $20,806 and a2 $9,991. #1 $20.402 and a2= $9.409

Exploring Economics

8th Edition

ISBN:9781544336329

Author:Robert L. Sexton

Publisher:Robert L. Sexton

Chapter15: Oligopoly And Strategic Behavior

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 15P

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