the final stage of Dmitri has a utility function U = W, where W is his wealth in millions of dollars and U is the utility he obtains from that wealth. a game show, the host offers Dmitri a choice between (A) $4 million for sure, or (B) a gamble that pays $1 million with probability 0.4 and $9 million with probability 0.6. Use the blue curve (circle points) to graph Dmitri's utility function at wealth levels of $0, $1 million, $4 million, $9 million, and $16 million. Utility (Thousands) 5.0 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0 0 2 4 8 6 10 12 14 Wealth (Millions of dollars) 16 18 20 V Utility Function ?

the final stage of Dmitri has a utility function U = W, where W is his wealth in millions of dollars and U is the utility he obtains from that wealth. a game show, the host offers Dmitri a choice between (A) $4 million for sure, or (B) a gamble that pays $1 million with probability 0.4 and $9 million with probability 0.6. Use the blue curve (circle points) to graph Dmitri's utility function at wealth levels of $0, $1 million, $4 million, $9 million, and $16 million. Utility (Thousands) 5.0 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0 0 2 4 8 6 10 12 14 Wealth (Millions of dollars) 16 18 20 V Utility Function ?

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Consider the lottery that assigns a probability T of obtaining a level of consumption CH and a probability 1-T an individual facing such a lottery with utility function u(c) that has the properties that more is better (that is, a strictly positive marginal utility of consumption at all levels of c) and diminishing marginal utility of consumption, u"(c) CL. Consider du(c) for the first derivative of the utility function with respect to dc du(c) du' (c) consumption and u"(c) (which is also the derivative of the first derivative of the utility function). to be the second derivative of the utility function dc dc2 1. Provide a definition for the certainty equivalent level of consumption for the simple lottery described above.
Consider a health insurance market. The market has many insurers so that each insurance company offers insurance at the fair insurance premium. Each consumer has utility function, and has an initial wealth of $200. Consumers have access to a (magical) gym that reduces their probability of needing to go to the doctor from 90% to 10%. A gym membership costs $6. A trip to the doctor costs $120. Suppose insurance companies charge the fair insurance premium which assumes all consumers go to the gym. This fair insurance premium is $? and the insurance company makes a profit of $? per consumer. Suppose insurance companies continue to charge the fair insurance premium that assumes all consumers go to the gym, but now charges a copay of $15 for a doctor's visit. The insurance company now makes a profit of $ per consumer. By implementing a copay, the insurance company the problem.
4. Two individuals, Amir and Budi, consume two goods, clothes (X) and shoes (Y). The utility functions for the two individuals are given as: Utility function of Amir, UA = 15X0.25Y0.75Utility function of Budi, UB = 25X0.5Y0.5 The current price for clothes (Px) is Rp 100,000 and the current price for shoes (PY) is Rp 150,000 a. Determine marginal rate of substitution (MRSXY)between clothes (X) and shoes (Y) for Amir and Budi! Please explain. b. Amir is currently consuming 5 units of clothes (X) and 10 units of shoes (Y), whereas Budi is consuming 12 units of clothes (X) and 8 units of shoes (Y). At this current consumption, have Amir and Budi reached the efficient allocation of clothes and shoes? If they have, explain why. If they have not, calculate the optimal allocation and explain. c. Considering the relative price between of clothes and shoes, at the current consumption, have Amir and Budi reached exchange equilibrium? Please explain d. Use the Edgeworth Box to illustrate the…
Scenario 2 Tess and Lex earn $40,000 per year and all earnings are spent on consumption (c). Tess and Lex both have the utility function (sqrt c) . Both could experience an adverse event that results in earnings of $0 per year. Tess has a 1% chance of experiencing an adverse event and Lex has a 12% chance of experiencing an adverse event. Tess and Lex are both aware of their risk of an adverse event. Refer to Scenario 2 Suppose that insurance companies do not know specific probabilities of adverse events for Tess or Lex, but do know the average probability of an adverse event. If they assumed that both Tess and Lex purchase full insurance, what is the actuarially fair premium charged? Round to two decimal places
Clancy has difficulty finding parking in his neighborhood and, thus, is considering the gamble of illegally parking on the sidewalk because of the opportunity cost of the time he spends searching for parking. On any given day, Clancy knows he may or may not get a ticket, but he also expects that if he were to do it every day, the average amount he would pay for parking tickets should converge to the expected value. If the expected value is positive, then in the long run, it will be optimal for him to park on the sidewalk and occasionally pay the tickets in exchange for the benefits of not searching for parking. Suppose that Clancy knows that the fine for parking this way is $100, and his opportunity cost (OC) of searching for parking is $20 per day. That is, if he parks on the sidewalk and does not get a ticket, he gets a positive payoff worth $20; if he does get a ticket, he ends up with a payoff of
1 Q1. Jerry has wealth of $60 and derives utility from this according to the utility function U(w) = 1 - Where w is his wealth. Jerry now finds a lottery ticket (the drawing takes place the next day) that offers a 50% chance of winning $5. W a) What is the expected value of Jerry if he takes the lottery ticket? (pay attention, it's not jerry's wealth) b) What is the minimum amount for which Jerry would be willing-to-sell the ticket? (Hint: sets a price of p, and at the minimum amount, the expected utility of selling and not selling should be the same) c) Which is bigger, your answer to (a) or (b), and suggest whether Jerry is a risk averse person based on the previous conclusion? d) If he does not sell the ticket, what is Jerry's cost of risk? (The cost of risk is the difference between the expected wealth and the certainty equivalence)
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Max Pentridge is thinking of starting a pinball palace near a large Melbourne university. His utility is given by u(W) = 1 - (5,000/W), where W is his wealth. Max's total wealth is $15,000. With probability p = 0.9 the palace will succeed and Max's wealth will grow from $15,000 to $x. With probability 1 - p the palace will be a failure and he’ll lose $10,000, so that his wealth will be just $5,000. What is the smallest value of x that would be sufficient to make Max want to invest in the pinball palace rather than have a wealth of $15,000 with certainty? (Please round your final answer to the whole dollar, if necessary)
An individual has a vNM utility function over money of u(x)= x, where x is final wealth. She currently has $8 and can choose among the following three lotteries. Which lottery will she choose? • Lottery 1: Give up her $8 and face the gamble (0.1, 0.5, 0.4) over final wealth levels ($1, $8, $27). • Lottery 2: Keep her $8. • Lottery 3: Give up her $8 and face the gamble (0.2, 0.8,0.0) over final wealth levels ($1, $8, $27) O Lottery 1 O Lottery 2 Lottery 3 O They are indifferent between lotteries 1 and 2 O They are indifferent between lotteries 2 and 3 O They are indifferent between lotteries 1 and 3 O They are indifferent between all three lotteris