Table 10-5 The following table shows the marginal costs for each of four firms (A, B, C, and D) to eliminate units of pollution from their production processes. For example, for Firm A to eliminate one unit of pollution, it would cost $54, and for Firm A to eliminate a second unit of pollution it would cost an additional $67. Marginal Cost to Eliminate Firm (Dollars) First Unit Second Unit Third Unit Fourth Unit 54 67 82 107 57 68 86 108 54 66 82 107 D 62 73 91 11 Refer to Table 10-5. If the government wanted to eliminate exactly 7 units of pollution, which of the following fees per unit of pollution would achieve that goal? S85 $87 er $71 $74 AB

Table 10-5 The following table shows the marginal costs for each of four firms (A, B, C, and D) to eliminate units of pollution from their production processes. For example, for Firm A to eliminate one unit of pollution, it would cost $54, and for Firm A to eliminate a second unit of pollution it would cost an additional $67. Marginal Cost to Eliminate Firm (Dollars) First Unit Second Unit Third Unit Fourth Unit 54 67 82 107 57 68 86 108 54 66 82 107 D 62 73 91 11 Refer to Table 10-5. If the government wanted to eliminate exactly 7 units of pollution, which of the following fees per unit of pollution would achieve that goal? S85 $87 er $71 $74 AB

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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