Suppose two firms compete in quantities (Cournot) in a market in which demand is described by: P=260-2Q. each firm incurs no fixed cost but has a marginal cost of 20. Now imagine they collude to produce the monopoly output. Suppose that after the cartel is established, firm 1 decides to cheat on the collusion, assuming the other firm will continue to produce its half of the monopoly output. What will be firm 1's profit if firm 2 continues producing the monopoly outcome? a. 4500 b. 5200 c.4200 d. 4050 Should firm 2 respond and increas their quantity? Yes or No
Suppose two firms compete in quantities (Cournot) in a market in which demand is described by: P=260-2Q. each firm incurs no fixed cost but has a marginal cost of 20. Now imagine they collude to produce the monopoly output. Suppose that after the cartel is established, firm 1 decides to cheat on the collusion, assuming the other firm will continue to produce its half of the monopoly output. What will be firm 1's profit if firm 2 continues producing the monopoly outcome? a. 4500 b. 5200 c.4200 d. 4050 Should firm 2 respond and increas their quantity? Yes or No
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1QTC
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Suppose two firms compete in quantities (Cournot) in a market in which demand is described by: P=260-2Q. each firm incurs no fixed cost but has a marginal cost of 20.
Now imagine they collude to produce the
Suppose that after the cartel is established, firm 1 decides to cheat on the collusion, assuming the other firm will continue to produce its half of the monopoly output.
What will be firm 1's profit if firm 2 continues producing the monopoly outcome?
a. 4500 b. 5200 c.4200 d. 4050
Should firm 2 respond and increas their quantity?
Yes or No
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