Suppose the first bill is passed, raising the probability of catching any given terrorist from 10% to 25%. However, this isn't enough forsome lawmakers. One representative introduces a bill that would increase security by an additional 5 percentage points.Again, assume these measures do not change the position of the blue curve. The opportunity cost of this additional measure isadditional visitors per year.Refer back to your previous answers. The opportunity cost of increasing the probability of catching a terrorist from 25% to 30% isthe opportunity cost of increasing that probability from 10% to 25%.million Assuming the security bill does not change the position of the blue curve, place the gray point (star symbol) on the graph to show the effects of such abill. (Hint: Be sure to plot your point on one of the black plus symbols.)SECURITY (Percent of terrorists caught)5093000+X20+406080TOURISM (Millions of visitors per year)100(?)Again, suppose the first bill that is introduced mandates that security be improved so that the probability of catching a terrorist at the border increasesfrom 10% to 25%, and these measures do not change the position of the blue curve. The opportunity cost of this increase in security ismillion visitors per year.

Opportunity cost is the forgone benefit that would have been gotten from a choice not picked. To…

Suppose the first bill is passed, raising the probability of catching any given terrorist from 10% to 25%. However, this isn't enough for some lawmakers. One representative introduces a bill that would increase security by an additional 5 percentage points. Again, assume these measures do not change the position of the blue curve. The opportunity cost of this additional measure is additional visitors per year. Refer back to your previous answers. The opportunity cost of increasing the probability of catching a terrorist from 25% to 30% is the opportunity cost of increasing that probability from 10% to 25%. million

Suppose the first bill is passed, raising the probability of catching any given terrorist from 10% to 25%. However, this isn't enough for some lawmakers. One representative introduces a bill that would increase security by an additional 5 percentage points. Again, assume these measures do not change the position of the blue curve. The opportunity cost of this additional measure is additional visitors per year. Refer back to your previous answers. The opportunity cost of increasing the probability of catching a terrorist from 25% to 30% is the opportunity cost of increasing that probability from 10% to 25%. million

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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