Required: Answer the following questions analyzing the following aspects of the case study
i. What is the primary issue in the case?
ii. How is the company doing strategically in terms of its existing strategy and business?
iii. Discuss any two of the qualitative and quantitative theories and models you can use from the case study and outside the case study to gain competitive advantage in the global business environment.
Transcribed Image Text: Brief Background of Toyota
Since establishment in 1933 as a division of Toyoda Automatic Loom Works, Toyota developed
from plain field, through many legendary well-known creative managements including production
setup time reduction, grouping the front workface into teams, decentralizing the responsibilities of
identifying and fixing defective parts to the whole team during assembling, developing Kanban
system on which the famous Just-In-Time inventory practice heavily relies, innovatively
organizing suppliers by incorporating them into the enterprise value chain of Toyota with long
term relation development, building unique distribution and customer relation with focus on
building long term ties with customers and bring their feedback on quality, styling, prices and other
features into Toyota's design and production process. By these distinct managements, Toyota has
achieved remarked advantages in production cost, product quality, wide range of models on a
limited range of platforms.
Though Toyota had disastrous experience when setting up an independent production subsidiary
in California with ambition to seize the small car market in USA, Toyota learned and improved a
lot in quality to suit the local conditions, in result made a triumphal turnaround in US market in
late 1960s. Moreover, the following oil price rise unexpectedly boosted the demand for Toyota's
cars which are light and fuel saving. Since then, worldwide exporting business of Toyota had been
a steady growth. In order to get around import barriers such as local content regulations and import
quotas, Toyota established a 50/50 joint venture named New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc.
(NUMMI) with General Motor in USA in 1983, and a wholly owned manufacturing facility in UK
in 1989 and another in France in 1997, and a 50/50 joint venture with French automaker Peugeot
in Czech Republic in 2002. Brave strides also have been happening in China, now the world's
fastest growing car market. Now Toyota has become the largest car manufacturer in the world,
320,808 people employed worldwide in 2010, 52 production facilities in 26 countries except in
Japan, 12 product design and research and development centers in 7 countries.
IBS of Toyota
Any firm that aims to expand foreign market initially intends to gain benefits of economies of scale
and location and learning effect which could be realized by and boost product and service
standardization. However, here unavoidably arise problems of localization due to demand for
response by the firm to local conditions like customer taste and preference, local government
regulations and cultural traits, etc. In the international business strategy matrix along two
dimensions of pressure for cost reductions and pressure for local responsiveness, transnational
strategy has the highest degrees along both dimensions.
Among the four typical international business strategy postures, Toyota, like many other
multinational enterprises (MNEs), chooses transnational Strategy. How best to implement a
transnational strategy is one of the most complex questions that large multinationals are grappling
with today. The need to compete with international competitors like GM and Ford forced Toyota
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to look for greater cost economies. However, variations in consumers taste and government
regulations across countries mean that Toyota also has to be responsive to local demands.
Therefore, Toyota confronts significant pressures for cost reductions and for local responsiveness.
To reduce cost by standardizing, Toyota has been accelerating the process of moving toward fewer
vehicle platforms, with goal of building a wide range of models on a limited range of platforms
that share many common components parts or modules. The company is reportedly working
toward a goal of having just 10 platforms, down from over 20 in 2000 (Hara 2004). To the almost
finished products with many common component parts, Toyota adds local product features,
tailoring the finished product to local needs. Thus, Toyota is able to realize many of the benefits
of global manufacturing while reacting to pressures for local responsiveness by differentiating its
product among national markets.
Entry to US Market
Toyota's early way into market was quite struggling. In 1957, Toyota tried to enter the US market,
by establishing a subsidiary in California. Later, it proven to be a nightmare; the Toyota cars
performed poorly in road tests on US highways. Obviously, Toyota people had not did enough
homework on the basic local conditions in US market, simply how Americans used cars. Due to
lack of local responsiveness, Toyota closed down its US subsidiary and withdrew from the market.
Back home, the company started to study the feedback from American consumer surveys and US
road tests, redesigned several of its models accordingly, and reshaped its market reputation
considerably in US market late 1960s, selling well with welcomed product characteristics and
consistently falling production cost and retail prices. Thanks to the oil price rise following the
Israeli/Arab conflict, US consumers shifted to small fuel-efficient cars in droves. Toyota was
among the main beneficiaries. Though this desire for small fuel-efficient cars in US market
happened without Toyota's prediction, it conformed to the traditional demand for this nature due
to the lack of natural resource at home, in Japan. This could be viewed at kind of learning effect
and knowledge transfer within global markets, that is, transfer of cumulative knowledge achieved
at Japanese operation to US market.
However, market changes. In early 1980s, import quotas imposed by United Stated over Toyota
stagnated export growth substantially. To cope with this problem, Toyota's first overseas
operation, NUMMI, was born. This step could be taken as a strategic entry of Toyota in US market
further. In this deal, Toyota designed the product and designed, equipped, and operated the plant,
while GM's role was marketing and distributing the plant's output. By this, Toyota obtained a
chance to see whether it could build quality cars in the US using American workers and American
suppliers, to experience dealing with an American union. All this knowledge later proved to be
invaluable. Meanwhile, the joint venture reduced the risk of jumping into a yet unknown market
by decreasing the investment scale and borrowing knowledge from GM. Encouraged by its success
at NUMMI and already having obtained knowledge of marketing, sales, service, etc in US market,
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Transcribed Image Text: Toyota established its first wholly owned product facility in US in 1986, followed by plants in
California, Indiana, Texas and Ontario, Canada.
Americanization as A Way of Localization
An important trend in Toyota management deserving high priority notice is steady and firm
Americanization. The company now sells more cars and trucks in North America than it does in
Japan, and over 60% of Toyota's global profits come from North America due to the richer market
mix of sport-utility vehicles and trucks. In adaption to this geographic sales shift, Americanization
has been increasingly evident in Toyota. First, American designers have influence much more than
before since they successfully convinced their Japanese managers to produce a V8 pickup truck
and redesign the hybrid car, Prius, for the American market; the two marques later turned out to
be big success in US and global markets. On the personnel front, more Americans (or Japanese
who have spent time in the U.S.) are climbing the corporate ladder. And new ideas about designs,
marketing, and innovation have has permeated the upper levels of the company and are seeping
down to everyone else. This is a good example of global strategy adaption to changing market mix.
Looking back to Toyota's NUMMI with GM, though significant knowledge and experience about
local conditions like marketing, unions were achieved, Toyota paid extremely high price for these
benefits. In return for the benefits Toyota gained, GM had an opportunity to observe in full detail
the Japanese approach to manufacturing which is part of the core competencies of Toyota,
including Kanban system, JIT inventory organization and relationship development with suppliers.
Once commanded by competitors, these competencies will become backfiring weapons in enemy's
hands; the productivity and quality gap between Toyota and its global competitors has narrowed.
GM and Ford have both made significant strides in improving their quality and productivity in
recent years. It is recommendable that Toyota be more careful of cooperating with competitors.
The benefits initially thought to be gained via that cooperation might be obtainable via other ways,
e.g. in the case of NUMMI, Toyota would have setup wholly owned facility for production hiring
senior veteran from the Big Three to help deal with local unions, while opening joint venture with
local big professional auto dealers for marketing and sales. For long term, this is conservative, but
less risky.
The 2009-2010 Toyota's recall crisis has been attracting worldwide eyeballs. Though people
believe it is partly due to political pressure, it does reflect some unnegligible quality problems.
According to news reports, the recall crisis partly lies in Toyota's radical ambition over cost cuts
and growth. In line with Toyota's companywide obsession with continuing to lower cost, an
ambitious initiative known as "Construction of Cost Competitiveness for the 21st Century", or
CCC21 was launched in 2000. That project has a goal of slashing component part costs by 30%
on all new models (Toyota 2002). To go further, at a 2006 investor conference in London,
eliminating vehicle parts and pushing suppliers to adopt lighter and cheaper materials was
discussed as way of exceeding the cost reduction results achieved in CCC21. On 24 Feb, 2010, at
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a hearing in the US House of Representatives, Akio Toyoda, the President and CEO of Toyota,
acknowledged their growth pace has been too quick, priorities became confused for Toyota
(Ohnsman, et al, 2010). Seemingly, it is not too late for Toyota to improve quality and restore
image in markets. But it is good example for every automaker to learn that going forward is
favorable only at right pace. To cut cost must be accompanied by strict quality control system to
prevent quality being compromised.
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