QUESTION 1 Stackelberg duopoly game is also known as the ________ model. If we change the Stackelberg ______ competition game to a simultaneous-move game, we get the ______ game results. leader-follower, quantity; Cournot Competitive fringe; price; backward induction leader-follower, quantity; Bertrand entry, price; Cournot
QUESTION 1
Stackelberg duopoly game is also known as the ________ model. If we change the Stackelberg ______ competition game to a simultaneous-move game, we get the ______ game results.
leader-follower, quantity; Cournot
Competitive fringe; price; backward induction
leader-follower, quantity; Bertrand
entry, price; Cournot
QUESTION 2
Comparing Stackelberg and Cournot competition results, we can say that the _____ is better off while the ______ is worse off under Stackelberg than under Cournot results. This result show that there is _______________ advantage.
entrant, incumbent, investment
leader, follower, first-mover
follower, leader, a size
incumbent, entrant, first-mover
QUESTION 3
Mark all the FALSE statements
An equilibrium is a collection of strategies (and a strategy is a complete plan of action), whereas an outcome describes what will happen only in the contingencies that are expected to arise, not in every contingency that might arise.
In games of complete but imperfect information, backward induction is still the strongest process to solve the model to get unique equilibrium.
All subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) are Nash equilibria (NE), but not all Nash equilibria is SPNE
We cannot apply the notion of Nash equilibrium to dynamic games of complete information if we allowed a player s strategy to leave unspecified actions in some contingencies.
A game can be of perfect information whenever Nature or Luck does not play, each information set does not necessarily need to have a single node.
QUESTION 4
True or false. Mark the correct sequence:I. Simultaneity of moves means that these games have imperfect information.II. Dynamic games of complete and perfect information do not necessarily need that a player observes all the previous moves, just part of them are fine.III. Backward induction and subgame perfect equilibrium concept lead to the same result in games of incomplete information.IV. Any game in extensive form is a subgame itself.
TFFT
TTTF
FTFF
TTFT
QUESTION 5
The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is the equilibrium associated with ____________ outcome. Subgame perfect equilibrium ________ non-credible threats.
Maxmin; involves
the backward induction; does not involve
Iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies; rules out
the backward induction; includes
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A. |
leader-follower, quantity; Cournot |
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B. |
Competitive fringe; price; backward induction |
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C. |
leader-follower, quantity; Bertrand |
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D. |
entry, price; Cournot |
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