**Question 1**The Bertrand model of oligopoly reveals that:- ○ capacity constraints are not important in determining market performance.- ○ perfectly competitive prices can arise in markets with only a few firms.- ○ changes in marginal cost do not affect prices.- ○ All of the statements associated with this question are true.**Question 2**If firms are in Cournot equilibrium:- ○ each firm could increase profits by unilaterally increasing output.- ○ each firm could increase profits by unilaterally decreasing output.- ○ firms could increase profits by jointly increasing output.- ○ firms could increase profits by jointly reducing output.

Oligopoly refers to competition with a few firms that produce a differentiated product, i.e. the…

The Bertrand model of oligopoly reveals that: capacity constraints are not important in determining market performance. perfectly competitive prices can arise in markets with only a few firms. changes in marginal cost do not affect prices. All of the statements associated with this question are true. O O O O

The Bertrand model of oligopoly reveals that: capacity constraints are not important in determining market performance. perfectly competitive prices can arise in markets with only a few firms. changes in marginal cost do not affect prices. All of the statements associated with this question are true. O O O O

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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