Please solve a Suppose that without a seat belt, drivers who travel at 0 m.p.h. (mile per hour) have a 100% chance of staying alive, while drivers who travel at 100 m.p.h. have 0% chance of staying alive. Suppose that with a seat belt, drivers who travel at 0 m.p.h. have a 100% chance of staying alive, drivers who travel at 100 m.p.h. have a 50 % chance of staying alive and drivers who travel at 200 m.p.h. has no chance of staying alive. (a) Suppose a driver prefers more chances of staying alive to less, driving faster than slower. Draw and indifference curve diagram relating safety (measured by chance of staying alive) on the horizontal axis and speed (measured in m.p.h.) on the vertical. Draw the budget constraints of a driver with a seat belt and a driver without a seat belt. (You may assume these constraints are straight lines.)

Please solve a Suppose that without a seat belt, drivers who travel at 0 m.p.h. (mile per hour) have a 100% chance of staying alive, while drivers who travel at 100 m.p.h. have 0% chance of staying alive. Suppose that with a seat belt, drivers who travel at 0 m.p.h. have a 100% chance of staying alive, drivers who travel at 100 m.p.h. have a 50 % chance of staying alive and drivers who travel at 200 m.p.h. has no chance of staying alive. (a) Suppose a driver prefers more chances of staying alive to less, driving faster than slower. Draw and indifference curve diagram relating safety (measured by chance of staying alive) on the horizontal axis and speed (measured in m.p.h.) on the vertical. Draw the budget constraints of a driver with a seat belt and a driver without a seat belt. (You may assume these constraints are straight lines.)

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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