Player 2 L C R T 2,0 1, 1 4, 2 Player 1 M 3,4 1,2 2,3 B 1,3 0,2 3,0 4. Consider the following static game in which Player 1 has three actions: T, M, B; and Player 2 has three actions: L, C, R. (a) Find the two Nash equilibria of this game. (b) Consider an alteration of the game. Action B is no longer available to Player 1, and Action R is no longer available to Player 2. When Player 2 plays L, Player 1 gets 5 instead of 2 when he plays T. Also, Player 1 will move first, and Player 2 will move second after observing Player l's move. Draw the game tree of this altered game and find the sub-game perfect equilibrium.
Player 2 L C R T 2,0 1, 1 4, 2 Player 1 M 3,4 1,2 2,3 B 1,3 0,2 3,0 4. Consider the following static game in which Player 1 has three actions: T, M, B; and Player 2 has three actions: L, C, R. (a) Find the two Nash equilibria of this game. (b) Consider an alteration of the game. Action B is no longer available to Player 1, and Action R is no longer available to Player 2. When Player 2 plays L, Player 1 gets 5 instead of 2 when he plays T. Also, Player 1 will move first, and Player 2 will move second after observing Player l's move. Draw the game tree of this altered game and find the sub-game perfect equilibrium.
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1QTC
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![015-FL20: Problem Set X
9 lai_146 fl20_ps5 (1).pdf
afos/Downloads/lai_146_fl20_ps5%20(1).pdf
Player 2
C
Т 2,0
1, 1
4,2
Player 1 M
3, 4
1,2 2,3
1,3 0,2 3,0
4. Consider the following static game in which Player 1 has three actions: T, M, B; and
Player 2 has three actions: L, C, R.
(a) Find the two Nash equilibria of this game.
(b) Consider an alteration of the game. Action B is no longer available to Player 1,
and Action R is no longer available to Player 2. When Player 2 plays L, Player 1
gets 5 instead of 2 when he plays T. Also, Player 1 will move first, and Player 2
will move second after observing Player l's move.
Draw the game tree of this altered game and find the sub-game perfect equilibrium.
R.](/v2/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcontent.bartleby.com%2Fqna-images%2Fquestion%2F01bcd568-ec77-480d-9c28-2a544878158b%2F822e3133-c124-4157-8991-ab81b2a1a9f5%2Ffupmh7_processed.jpeg&w=3840&q=75)
Transcribed Image Text:015-FL20: Problem Set X
9 lai_146 fl20_ps5 (1).pdf
afos/Downloads/lai_146_fl20_ps5%20(1).pdf
Player 2
C
Т 2,0
1, 1
4,2
Player 1 M
3, 4
1,2 2,3
1,3 0,2 3,0
4. Consider the following static game in which Player 1 has three actions: T, M, B; and
Player 2 has three actions: L, C, R.
(a) Find the two Nash equilibria of this game.
(b) Consider an alteration of the game. Action B is no longer available to Player 1,
and Action R is no longer available to Player 2. When Player 2 plays L, Player 1
gets 5 instead of 2 when he plays T. Also, Player 1 will move first, and Player 2
will move second after observing Player l's move.
Draw the game tree of this altered game and find the sub-game perfect equilibrium.
R.
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