Now consider the same industry but assume that two firms with the same cost function c(qi) = 2 * qi for i = {1,2} are active in this market. What is the price that realizes when they set prices in a simultanous move game (ie they play Bertrand). firm is instead Assume now that the cost of the second c(9₂2) = 5 * 92 What is the equilibrium price if they again play Bertrand? (round to the nearest whole number)
Now consider the same industry but assume that two firms with the same cost function c(qi) = 2 * qi for i = {1,2} are active in this market. What is the price that realizes when they set prices in a simultanous move game (ie they play Bertrand). firm is instead Assume now that the cost of the second c(9₂2) = 5 * 92 What is the equilibrium price if they again play Bertrand? (round to the nearest whole number)
Chapter15: Imperfect Competition
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 15.3P
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Question 3 options:
Now consider the same industry but assume that two firms with the same cost function
c
(
q
i
)
=
2
∗
q
i
f
o
r
i
∈
{
1
,
2
}
are active in this market.
What is the price that realizes when they set prices in a simultanous move game (ie they play Bertrand).
Assume now that the cost of the second firm is instead
c
(
q
2
)
=
5
∗
q
2
What is the equilibrium price if they again play Bertrand? (round to the nearest whole number)
![Now consider the same industry but assume that two firms with the same cost
function
c(qi) = 2 * qi for i = {1,2}
are active in this market.
What is the price that realizes when they set prices in a simultanous move game (ie
they play Bertrand).
firm is instead
Assume now that the cost of the second
c(92) = 5 * 92
What is the equilibrium price if they again play Bertrand? (round to the nearest
whole number)](/v2/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcontent.bartleby.com%2Fqna-images%2Fquestion%2F912f686b-0788-4f7a-83ed-36a22111946c%2Fe6482892-01ce-404d-9432-440419032ec4%2Fz30sxxo_processed.jpeg&w=3840&q=75)
Transcribed Image Text:Now consider the same industry but assume that two firms with the same cost
function
c(qi) = 2 * qi for i = {1,2}
are active in this market.
What is the price that realizes when they set prices in a simultanous move game (ie
they play Bertrand).
firm is instead
Assume now that the cost of the second
c(92) = 5 * 92
What is the equilibrium price if they again play Bertrand? (round to the nearest
whole number)
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