Consider a two-firm industry producing two differentiated products indexed by i = 1,2. For simplicity, we assume that production is costless. Suppose that the demand functions for the two products are given by q1 = 168 2p1 + p2 and q2 = 168 - 2p2 + p1. a Suppose that the two firms set their price independently and simultaneously. Find the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. b Suppose that the two firms move sequentially rather than simultaneously. In particular, suppose that firm 1 sets its price first. After observing firm 1' selection, firm 2 chooses its price. Find the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
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ISBN:9780190931919
Author:NEWNAN
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Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
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Consider a two-firm industry producing two
differentiated products indexed by i = 1,2.
For simplicity, we assume that production is
costless. Suppose that the demand
functions for the two products are given by
q1 = 168 2p1 + p2 and q2 = 168 - 2p2 +
p1.
a
Suppose that the two firms set their price
independently and simultaneously. Find the
Bertrand-Nash equilibrium.
b
Suppose that the two firms move
sequentially rather than simultaneously. In
particular, suppose that firm 1 sets its price
first. After observing firm 1' selection, firm 2
chooses its price. Find the Subgame Perfect
Nash Equilibrium.
Transcribed Image Text:Consider a two-firm industry producing two differentiated products indexed by i = 1,2. For simplicity, we assume that production is costless. Suppose that the demand functions for the two products are given by q1 = 168 2p1 + p2 and q2 = 168 - 2p2 + p1. a Suppose that the two firms set their price independently and simultaneously. Find the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. b Suppose that the two firms move sequentially rather than simultaneously. In particular, suppose that firm 1 sets its price first. After observing firm 1' selection, firm 2 chooses its price. Find the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium.
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