n Game 1 below, the US and Iran are bargaining over the state of Iran’s nuclear program. The US must first decide whether to impose sanctions on Iran or propose a compromise. If the US imposes sanctions, Iran can either back down or retaliate. If the US proposes a compromise, Iran can either accept it or accelerate its nuclear effort. If Iran does the latter, the US can either back down (i.e., the US is “weak”) or conduct an air strike (i.e., the US is “strong”). The background to this game is similar to ones we have discussed before. Iran’s nuclear program can range from 0 to 1, where 0 means no nuclear program and 1 means a fully functioning nuclear weapon. Any intermediate compromise X (which must lie between 0 and 1, 0 < X < 1) gives Iran a utility of X and the US a utility of 1-X. Payoffs for the other outcomes are as shown in the cells: the top number represents the US payoff, and the bottom number represents Iran’s payoff. (Don’t worry about where these numbers come from—just take them as given.)   Question: 1. In Game 1, is the US “weak” or “strong”? Why? 2.In Game 1, what kind of compromise would Iran accept as preferable to accelerating its nuclear program? Why?

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
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Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
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In Game 1 below, the US and Iran are bargaining over the state of Iran’s nuclear program. The US must first decide whether to impose sanctions on Iran or propose a compromise. If the US imposes sanctions, Iran can either back down or retaliate. If the US proposes a compromise, Iran can either accept it or accelerate its nuclear effort. If Iran does the latter, the US can either back down (i.e., the US is “weak”) or conduct an air strike (i.e., the US is “strong”).

The background to this game is similar to ones we have discussed before. Iran’s nuclear program can range from 0 to 1, where 0 means no nuclear program and 1 means a fully functioning nuclear weapon. Any intermediate compromise X (which must lie between 0 and 1, 0 < X < 1) gives Iran a utility of X and the US a utility of 1-X. Payoffs for the other outcomes are as shown in the cells: the top number represents the US payoff, and the bottom number represents Iran’s payoff. (Don’t worry about where these numbers come from—just take them as given.)

 

Question:

1. In Game 1, is the US “weak” or “strong”? Why?

2.In Game 1, what kind of compromise would Iran accept as preferable to accelerating its nuclear program? Why?

Game 1
US
Propose
Compromise
Punish with
Sanctions
Iran
Iran
Back
Accelerate
Retaliate
Ассept
compromise
down
nuclear effort
US
1
.6
Back
Air
.3
1-X
down
strike
-.2
1
.4
Transcribed Image Text:Game 1 US Propose Compromise Punish with Sanctions Iran Iran Back Accelerate Retaliate Ассept compromise down nuclear effort US 1 .6 Back Air .3 1-X down strike -.2 1 .4
Expert Solution
Step 1

Players : { US, Iran}

Strategy US= { PC BD, PC AS, PS BD, PS AS}

Strategy Iran= {AC BD, NE BD, AC RE, NE RE}

 

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