MB, MC 10- 8- 6 4 Reference: Ref 16-2 MB₂ Select one: A. III B. I MB, C. II D. I and III MB 10 (Figure 16.2) Lilly, who owns the Cigar Bar and Grill, is considering whether to purchase fire insurance. Without insurance, the marginal benefit of precautions to reduce the risk of fire is given by MB₁. Which of the following statements is (are) TRUE? I. With full insurance, the marginal benefit of acting to reduce the risk of fire is given by MB3. Quantity of actions taken to improve fire protection II. If Lilly purchases fire insurance, whether it is full or partial coverage, the marginal benefits of acting to reduce the risk of fire will increase. III. With partial insurance, the marginal benefit of acting to reduce the risk of fire is given by MB2.

MB, MC 10- 8- 6 4 Reference: Ref 16-2 MB₂ Select one: A. III B. I MB, C. II D. I and III MB 10 (Figure 16.2) Lilly, who owns the Cigar Bar and Grill, is considering whether to purchase fire insurance. Without insurance, the marginal benefit of precautions to reduce the risk of fire is given by MB₁. Which of the following statements is (are) TRUE? I. With full insurance, the marginal benefit of acting to reduce the risk of fire is given by MB3. Quantity of actions taken to improve fire protection II. If Lilly purchases fire insurance, whether it is full or partial coverage, the marginal benefits of acting to reduce the risk of fire will increase. III. With partial insurance, the marginal benefit of acting to reduce the risk of fire is given by MB2.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Alana wishes to obtain auto insurance. She wants 100/300/100 liability coverage, $250 deductible collision and full coverage comprehensive. She lives in territory 2 and has been assigned to driver class 2 with a rating factor of 1.25. Based on Table 19-6 and Table 19-7, what would be her total premium, if her three-year-old car were in model class L? (Round your answer to the nearest cent.) a. $355.00 b. $365.00 c. $456.25 d. $465.38
Then what of part d, e and f?
Exercise 4: Insurance Fiona has von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u(x) = VT and initial wealth 640, 000. She faces a 25% chance of losing L = 280, 000. 1. Is Fiona risk averse? 2. What is Fiona's utility if no loss occurs, what is her utility if the loss occurs? What is Fiona's expected utility? 3. What is the cost of fair insurance against the possible loss? Suppose Fiona is able to choose insurance with any coverage z E [0, 1] (i.e. 0 0 C(z) = if z = 0 4. Suppose co = 0 and c1 = 70,000. Is insurance at coverage level z > 0 fair insurance? What coverage level z* would Fiona choose? Explain. 5. Suppose co = 100 and c1 = 70,000. Is insurance at coverage level z > 0 fair insurance? What coverage level z** would Fiona choose? Explain. (Note that co = 100 is an "avoidable fixed cost" which is only paid if she chooses strictly positive insurance coverage. However, the "marginal cost" of additional insurance, c1 = 70,000, is the same as in the previous part.) 6. Suppose co = 100 and…
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2. Consider an individual with a current wealth of $100,000 who faces the prospect of a 25% chance of losing $20,000 through theft of her car during the next year. If the person’s utility function is U(X) = ln(X), where X is wealth: a. calculate expected utility without insurance, b. calculate the actuarially fair premium for full insurance, c. calculate expected utility with full insurance at the actuarially fair premium d. calculate the maximum amount the individual would pay for full insurance.
help please answer in text form with proper workings and explanation for each and every part and steps with concept and introduction no AI no copy paste remember answer must be in proper format with all working
Question 5 Now, instead assume an individual has income of $100,000, a 10% chance of incurring a $75,000 accident, and a 20% chance of a $10,000 accident (and a 70% chance of no accident). The utility function is represented by U = C. What premium would be charged to provide full insurance coverage against all adverse states of the world? ers 9,500 9,500 (with margin: 0)
Moral Hasard and Insurance The utility is U = W1/2 − 350S + 95S1/2 ; where W is wealth and S is care taken to avoid accidents. Probability of accident is 0.70 − S1/2 Wealth is ✩850,000 without accident and ✩300,000 with accident. Calculate S, EU and CE without insurance. Calculate S and EU with full insurance
Please see the image below and help answer the questions.
4. A taproom owner is trying to determine how to structure his manager's compensation. One option he considers is a flat salary of $70,000 per year. The second option is a base salary of $30,000 plus 15% of the taproom's profit. If the manager puts a lot of effort into her job, the taproom's annual profit will be $500,000 with 75% probability and $100,000 with 25% probability. If the manager exerts only modest effort, the taproom's profit will be $500,000 with 25% probability and $100,000 with 75% probability. The manager's opportunity cost of putting a lot of effort into her job is $50,000, while her opportunity cost of exerting only modest effort is $25,000. a. Draw the game tree for the interaction between the taproom owner and the manager. Assume that the taproom owner moves first. b. What is the equilibrium outcome for this game? What kind of contract should the taproom owner offer? What level of effort will the manager choose? Explain.
Exercise 5: Insurance Consider two individuals, Dave and Eva. Both Dave and Eva have initial wealth 810,000 and face a 40% chance of losing L = 450, 000. Dave has von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function up(x) = x and Eva has von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function ug (x) = VT. 1. What do you know about Dave's and Eva's risk preferences? 2. What is the most Dave would be willing to pay for complete insurance against the loss? 3. What is the most Eva would be willing to pay for complete insurance against the loss? Suppose they are each able choose insurance with any coverage level z [0, 1] (i.e. 0 0. 6. Is Eva's optimal choice full insurance, i.e. z = 1?
6. Answer which happens, moral hazard or adverse selection, or nothing happens under each of the following situations. [M20]: A driver drives a car rough because s/he has a property insurance of a car. b. Adverse selection [M21]: Since a driver cannot distinguish among qualities of cars, s/he may buy a bad one. a. Moral hazard c. nothing a. Moral hazard b. Adverse selection c. nothing [M22]: Banks look for lenders, but most customers who apply for loans seem to have difficulty repaying them even in assuming they make an identical effort. a. Moral hazard b. Adverse selection c. nothing