Initially there is a dollar on the table and player-1 can either pick it up or say "Pass". If he pic the money up, the game ends. If he passes, another bill is added, and player-2 has the same option If there are 4 passes the game ends and the four bills are removed from the table. Player-1 is pa 3.5 and player-2 is paid 3.5. the sub-game perfect equilibria are (a) (1,0) (b) (0,2) (c) (3,0) (d) (0, 4)

Initially there is a dollar on the table and player-1 can either pick it up or say "Pass". If he pic the money up, the game ends. If he passes, another bill is added, and player-2 has the same option If there are 4 passes the game ends and the four bills are removed from the table. Player-1 is pa 3.5 and player-2 is paid 3.5. the sub-game perfect equilibria are (a) (1,0) (b) (0,2) (c) (3,0) (d) (0, 4)

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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