2- Consider the following game.Player 2Player 1 U 12, 2 | 3, 95, 8 4, 2D(a) Find all the Nash equilibria, pure and mixed.(b) Suppose that the payoff of the column player u:(D, L) is reduced from 8 to 6, but all otherpayoffs remain the same. Again, find all the pure- and mixed-strategy Nash equilibria.(c) Compare the mixed-strategy equilibria in parts (a) and (b). Did this worsening in one of player 2'spayoffs change player 2's equilibrium mixed strategy? Did it change player l's? Give some intuition.

Nash equilibrium is an idea inside game theory where the ideal result of a game is in the same…

2- Consider the following game. Player 2 LR Player 1 U 12, 2 3,9 | D 5, 8 4, 2 (a) Find all the Nash equilibria, pure and mixed. (b) Suppose that the payoff of the column player u:(D, L) is reduced from 8 to 6, but all other navoffs remain the same Again find all the nure, and mixed-strategy Nash cauilibria

2- Consider the following game. Player 2 LR Player 1 U 12, 2 3,9 | D 5, 8 4, 2 (a) Find all the Nash equilibria, pure and mixed. (b) Suppose that the payoff of the column player u:(D, L) is reduced from 8 to 6, but all other navoffs remain the same Again find all the nure, and mixed-strategy Nash cauilibria

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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