(b) ROWENA up down Answer 1: up In this simultaneous move game, the iterated dominance equilibrium is (Rowena's Colin's left Answer 2: left Up Down This game has two Nash equilibria one of which is the iterated dominance equilibrium. The other Nash equilibrium, which is not the IDE, is (Rowena's Colin's right Answer 3: Left down 0,0 0,0 COLIN Right 0,0 1,1

(b) ROWENA up down Answer 1: up In this simultaneous move game, the iterated dominance equilibrium is (Rowena's Colin's left Answer 2: left Up Down This game has two Nash equilibria one of which is the iterated dominance equilibrium. The other Nash equilibrium, which is not the IDE, is (Rowena's Colin's right Answer 3: Left down 0,0 0,0 COLIN Right 0,0 1,1

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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1. Consider the following N-player game. Each agent has a choice of strategy A or B. The state variable is x, the proportion of agents choosing strategy A. For every agent, the utility of choosing strategy A is U(A) = 10 +2x and the utility of choosing strategy B is U(B) = 10+3x. What is the Nash equilibrium to this game? Explain.
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