1. Consider the strategic form game represented by the following bimatrix, where player 1 is the row and player 2 is the column player P1/P2 R T а, b с, 2 M 1, 1 1,0 B 3, 2 0, 1 and where a, b, and c are numbers that are left unspecified for now. a. For what (range of) values of a, b and c the outcome (T, L) is a strictly dominant strategy equilibrium? b. For what (range of) values of a, b and c the outcome (T, L) is a Nash equilibrium? c. For what (range of) values of a and c, the mixed strategy in which P1 plays T with probability ½ and B with probability ½ strictly dominates strategy M?

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
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1. Consider the strategic form game represented by the following bimatrix, where
player 1 is the row and player 2 is the column player
P1/P2
R
а, b
с, 2
M
1, 1
1,0
3, 2
0, 1
and where a, b, and c are numbers that are left unspecified for now.
a. For what (range of) values of a, b and c the outcome (T, L) is a strictly dominant
strategy equilibrium?
b. For what (range of) values of a, b and c the outcome (T, L) is a Nash equilibrium?
c. For what (range of) values of a and c, the mixed strategy in which P1 plays T with
probability 2 and B with probability 2 strictly dominates strategy M?
Transcribed Image Text:1. Consider the strategic form game represented by the following bimatrix, where player 1 is the row and player 2 is the column player P1/P2 R а, b с, 2 M 1, 1 1,0 3, 2 0, 1 and where a, b, and c are numbers that are left unspecified for now. a. For what (range of) values of a, b and c the outcome (T, L) is a strictly dominant strategy equilibrium? b. For what (range of) values of a, b and c the outcome (T, L) is a Nash equilibrium? c. For what (range of) values of a and c, the mixed strategy in which P1 plays T with probability 2 and B with probability 2 strictly dominates strategy M?
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