Consider a simultaneous-choice game in which the principal can choose to delegate (D) or centralise (C) and a worker can opt for either low (L) or high (H) effort. The payoffs are (1, 2) if the choices are (D, L) to the principal and the agent, respectively. The payoffs are (3, 4) if the choices are (C, H). If either (C, L) or (D, H) are chosen, the payoffs are O to both players. If in the mixed strategy equilibrium, the principal plays D with probabilty a and the worker plays L with probability b, what is outcome in the mixed strategy equilibrium? O a 3/4; b = 2/3 O None of the other answers are correct. O a 2/3; b = 3/4 O a 1/3; b= 1/2 O a 1/2; b= 1/3
Consider a simultaneous-choice game in which the principal can choose to delegate (D) or centralise (C) and a worker can opt for either low (L) or high (H) effort. The payoffs are (1, 2) if the choices are (D, L) to the principal and the agent, respectively. The payoffs are (3, 4) if the choices are (C, H). If either (C, L) or (D, H) are chosen, the payoffs are O to both players. If in the mixed strategy equilibrium, the principal plays D with probabilty a and the worker plays L with probability b, what is outcome in the mixed strategy equilibrium? O a 3/4; b = 2/3 O None of the other answers are correct. O a 2/3; b = 3/4 O a 1/3; b= 1/2 O a 1/2; b= 1/3
Chapter8: Game Theory
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 8.1P
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M1
![Consider a simultaneous-choice game in which the principal can choose to delegate (D) or centralise (C) and a worker can opt for either low (L) or high (H) effort. The payoffs are (1, 2) if the choices are (D, L)
to the principal and the agent, respectively. The payoffs are (3, 4) if the choices are (C, H). If either (C, L) or (D, H) are chosen, the payoffs are O to both players. If in the mixed strategy equilibrium, the principal
plays D with probabilty a and the worker plays L with probability b, what is outcome in the mixed strategy equilibrium?
O a = 3/4; b = 2/3
O None of the other answers are correct.
O a = 2/3; b = 3/4
O a 1/3; b= 1/2
O a 1/2; b= 1/3](/v2/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcontent.bartleby.com%2Fqna-images%2Fquestion%2F13324de3-31d6-46cf-acc2-e14cf164623c%2F008e533c-8783-487c-86e2-a1e46948ec95%2Fb75rhhj_processed.jpeg&w=3840&q=75)
Transcribed Image Text:Consider a simultaneous-choice game in which the principal can choose to delegate (D) or centralise (C) and a worker can opt for either low (L) or high (H) effort. The payoffs are (1, 2) if the choices are (D, L)
to the principal and the agent, respectively. The payoffs are (3, 4) if the choices are (C, H). If either (C, L) or (D, H) are chosen, the payoffs are O to both players. If in the mixed strategy equilibrium, the principal
plays D with probabilty a and the worker plays L with probability b, what is outcome in the mixed strategy equilibrium?
O a = 3/4; b = 2/3
O None of the other answers are correct.
O a = 2/3; b = 3/4
O a 1/3; b= 1/2
O a 1/2; b= 1/3
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