he weighted voting systems for the voters A, B, C, ... are given in the form {g: w1, W2, W3, W4. .., Wn. The weight of voter A is w1, the weight of voter B is w2, the weight of voter C is 3, and so on. onsider the weighted voting system {56: 3, 53, 55}. (a) Compute the Banzhaf power index for each voter in this system. (Round your answers to the nearest hundredth.) BPI(A) = BPI(B) = BPI(C) = (b) Voter B has a weight of 53 compared to only 3 for voter A, yet the results of part (a) show that voter A and voter B both have the same Banzhaf power index. Explain why it seems reasonable, in this voting system, to assign voters A and B the same Banzhaf power index. O Despite the varied weights, in this system, all voters are dummy voters. No voter is critical to a successful outcome. O Despite the varied weights, in this system, all of the voters are needed for a quota. O Despite the varied weights, this is a majority system. Any two of the three voters are needed for a quota. O Despite the varied weights, this is a dictator system. Voter C controls the outcome, while voters A and B are dummy voters. O Despite the varied weights, this is a minority system. Any one of the three voters can stop a quota.
he weighted voting systems for the voters A, B, C, ... are given in the form {g: w1, W2, W3, W4. .., Wn. The weight of voter A is w1, the weight of voter B is w2, the weight of voter C is 3, and so on. onsider the weighted voting system {56: 3, 53, 55}. (a) Compute the Banzhaf power index for each voter in this system. (Round your answers to the nearest hundredth.) BPI(A) = BPI(B) = BPI(C) = (b) Voter B has a weight of 53 compared to only 3 for voter A, yet the results of part (a) show that voter A and voter B both have the same Banzhaf power index. Explain why it seems reasonable, in this voting system, to assign voters A and B the same Banzhaf power index. O Despite the varied weights, in this system, all voters are dummy voters. No voter is critical to a successful outcome. O Despite the varied weights, in this system, all of the voters are needed for a quota. O Despite the varied weights, this is a majority system. Any two of the three voters are needed for a quota. O Despite the varied weights, this is a dictator system. Voter C controls the outcome, while voters A and B are dummy voters. O Despite the varied weights, this is a minority system. Any one of the three voters can stop a quota.
Advanced Engineering Mathematics
10th Edition
ISBN:9780470458365
Author:Erwin Kreyszig
Publisher:Erwin Kreyszig
Chapter2: Second-order Linear Odes
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1RQ
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The weighted voting systems for the voters A, B, C, ... are given in the form
{q: w1, w2, w3, w4, ..., wn}.
The weight of voter A is w1, the weight of voter B is w2, the weight of voter C is w3, and so on.
Consider the weighted voting system {56: 3, 53, 55}.
(A) Compute the Banzhaf power index for each voter in this system. (Round your answers to the nearest hundredth.)
(B) Voter B has a weight of 53 compared to only 3 for voter A, yet the results of part (a) show that voter A and voter B both have the same Banzhaf power index. Explain why it seems reasonable, in this voting system, to assign voters A and B the same Banzhaf power index.
BPI(A) | = | |
BPI(B) | = | |
BPI(C) | = |
(B) Voter B has a weight of 53 compared to only 3 for voter A, yet the results of part (a) show that voter A and voter B both have the same Banzhaf power index. Explain why it seems reasonable, in this voting system, to assign voters A and B the same Banzhaf power index.
Pick the correct answer:
A) Despite the varied weights, in this system, all voters are dummy voters. No voter is critical to a successful outcome.
B) Despite the varied weights, in this system, all of the voters are needed for a quota.
C) Despite the varied weights, this is a majority system. Any two of the three voters are needed for a quota.
D) Despite the varied weights, this is a dictator system. Voter C controls the outcome, while voters A and B are dummy voters.
E) Despite the varied weights, this is a minority system. Any one of the three voters can stop a quota.
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