The weighted voting systems for the voters A, B, C, ... are given in the form  {q: w1, w2, w3, w4, ..., wn}.  The weight of voter A is w1, the weight of voter B is w2, the weight of voter C is w3, and so on. Consider the weighted voting system {73: 4, 69, 71}. (a) Compute the Banzhaf power index for each voter in this system. (Round your answers to the nearest hundredth.) BPI(A)  =    BPI(B)  =    BPI(C)  =    (b) Voter B has a weight of 69 compared to only 4 for voter A, yet the results of part (a) show that voter A and voter B both have the same Banzhaf power index. Explain why it seems reasonable, in this voting system, to assign voters A and B the same Banzhaf power index: a) Despite the varied weights, in this system, all of the voters are needed for a quota. b) Despite the varied weights, this is a dictator system. Voter C controls the outcome, while voters A and B are dummy voters. c) Despite the varied weights, in this system, all voters are dummy voters. No voter is critical to a successful outcome. d) Despite the varied weights, this is a minority system. Any one of the three voters can stop a quota. e) Despite the varied weights, this is a majority system. Any two of the three voters are needed for a quota