Exercise 11 D ominance and Best Responses (H) (a) Show that if an action is a best response (to some str ategy of the other players), then it is undominated. (b) Show that ever y weakly dominant strategy is pure. (c) Now, let N = {1, 2} and s¡ be a best response for player 1 to both t and t. Show that s; is also a best respon se to all mixtures t of t and t', where for any pE [0, 1], t? is defined by t = [p: t, (1 – p) : t"].

Exercise 11 D ominance and Best Responses (H) (a) Show that if an action is a best response (to some str ategy of the other players), then it is undominated. (b) Show that ever y weakly dominant strategy is pure. (c) Now, let N = {1, 2} and s¡ be a best response for player 1 to both t and t. Show that s; is also a best respon se to all mixtures t of t and t', where for any pE [0, 1], t? is defined by t = [p: t, (1 – p) : t"].

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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