Consider two students, Hana and Avan at AUIS. Both students are taking their final exam in their economic class today and they are both, independently, trying to decide whether they will conceal or reveal their answers while working on the exam. It takes time and effort to conceal answers so both students realize that revealing their answers will allow them to concentrate more fully on the exam. In addition, they both realize that if the other student reveals his answers they may potentially improve their scores. Avan believes she will make an 85 on the exam if both students conceal their answers, an 80 on the exam if she conceals her answers while Hana reveals her answers, an 87 on the exam if she reveals her answers while Hana does not reveal her answers, and an 85 on the exam if both students do not conceal their answers. Hana knows that if she conceals her answers she will get a 60 on the exam and if she does not conceal her answers she will get a 65 provided that Avan conceals her answers. Hana knows that she will make a 75 on the exam if she conceals her answers while Avan reveals her answers; Hana will make a 80 on the exam if both Hana and Avan do not conceal their answers. Create the pay-off matrix and answer the following questions; Based on the above information do Hana and Avan have a dominant strategy with regard to concealing or revealing their answers? What are the dominant strategies for both? Based on the above information, suppose that two students play a one-off game – that is, they interact only once and never again. What will be the Nash (non-cooperative) Equilibrium in this game? Based on the above information, will there be any collusion between Hana and Avan in this game? If yes, what will be the collusion?
Consider two students, Hana and Avan at AUIS. Both students are taking their final exam in their economic class today and they are both, independently, trying to decide whether they will conceal or reveal their answers while working on the exam. It takes time and effort to conceal answers so both students realize that revealing their answers will allow them to concentrate more fully on the exam. In addition, they both realize that if the other student reveals his answers they may potentially improve their scores.
Avan believes she will make an 85 on the exam if both students conceal their answers, an 80 on the exam if she conceals her answers while Hana reveals her answers, an 87 on the exam if she reveals her answers while Hana does not reveal her answers, and an 85 on the exam if both students do not conceal their answers. Hana knows that if she conceals her answers she will get a 60 on the exam and if she does not conceal her answers she will get a 65 provided that Avan conceals her answers. Hana knows that she will make a 75 on the exam if she conceals her answers while Avan reveals her answers; Hana will make a 80 on the exam if both Hana and Avan do not conceal their answers.
Create the pay-off matrix and answer the following questions;
Based on the above information do Hana and Avan have a dominant strategy with regard to concealing or revealing their answers? What are the dominant strategies for both?
Based on the above information, suppose that two students play a one-off game – that is, they interact only once and never again. What will be the Nash (non-cooperative) Equilibrium in this game?
Based on the above information, will there be any collusion between Hana and Avan in this game? If yes, what will be the collusion?
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