Q1. Suppose player A and player B are playing the following game. Player A can choose "Up" and "Down", while player B can choose "Left" and "Right". The payoff matrix is depicted below. Player A's payoff is the first entry. Player B's payoff is the second entry. Player A U D Run a. Suppose this is a one-shot, simultaneously-move game, find all the Nash equilibria (pure and mixed). (-25,-4) Player B L (7,5) (1, 1) Q2. Consider this sequential game. Assume the players can only use pure strategies Drive Player 1 Player 2 Walk Run R (1, 1) (4, 10) Fly Walk Swim (10,0) (3,20) (2,10) (1,9) a. Use backward induction to solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Q1. Suppose player A and player B are playing the following game. Player A can choose "Up" and "Down", while player B can choose "Left" and "Right". The payoff matrix is depicted below. Player A's payoff is the first entry. Player B's payoff is the second entry. Player A U D Run a. Suppose this is a one-shot, simultaneously-move game, find all the Nash equilibria (pure and mixed). (-25,-4) Player B L (7,5) (1, 1) Q2. Consider this sequential game. Assume the players can only use pure strategies Drive Player 1 Player 2 Walk Run R (1, 1) (4, 10) Fly Walk Swim (10,0) (3,20) (2,10) (1,9) a. Use backward induction to solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1QTC
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Please help with #1
![Q1. Suppose player A and player B are playing the following game. Player A can choose "Up" and
"Down", while player B can choose "Left" and "Right". The payoff matrix is depicted below. Player
A's payoff is the first entry. Player B's payoff is the second entry.
Player A
U
D
Player B
L
(7,5)
(1, 1)
a. Suppose this is a one-shot, simultaneously-move game, find all the Nash equilibria (pure and
mixed).
Run
Q2. Consider this sequential game. Assume the players can only use pure strategies
(-25,-4)
R
(1, 1)
(4, 10)
Player 1
Drive
Fly
FA
Player 2
Walk Run
(10,0)
(3, 20)
Walk
Swim
(2,10) (1,9)
a. Use backward induction to solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.](/v2/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcontent.bartleby.com%2Fqna-images%2Fquestion%2Ffa0be278-2f71-466e-9833-8ca04e5616ee%2Feb666576-68b6-4b6a-a12d-69bd975c0bcb%2Fp5oulh_processed.jpeg&w=3840&q=75)
Transcribed Image Text:Q1. Suppose player A and player B are playing the following game. Player A can choose "Up" and
"Down", while player B can choose "Left" and "Right". The payoff matrix is depicted below. Player
A's payoff is the first entry. Player B's payoff is the second entry.
Player A
U
D
Player B
L
(7,5)
(1, 1)
a. Suppose this is a one-shot, simultaneously-move game, find all the Nash equilibria (pure and
mixed).
Run
Q2. Consider this sequential game. Assume the players can only use pure strategies
(-25,-4)
R
(1, 1)
(4, 10)
Player 1
Drive
Fly
FA
Player 2
Walk Run
(10,0)
(3, 20)
Walk
Swim
(2,10) (1,9)
a. Use backward induction to solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
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