Please help with #1 Q1. Suppose player A and player B are playing the following game. Player A can choose "Up" and"Down", while player B can choose "Left" and "Right". The payoff matrix is depicted below. PlayerA's payoff is the first entry. Player B's payoff is the second entry.Player AUDPlayer BL(7,5)(1, 1)a. Suppose this is a one-shot, simultaneously-move game, find all the Nash equilibria (pure andmixed).RunQ2. Consider this sequential game. Assume the players can only use pure strategies(-25,-4)R(1, 1)(4, 10)Player 1DriveFlyFAPlayer 2Walk Run(10,0)(3, 20)WalkSwim(2,10) (1,9)a. Use backward induction to solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.

As per student request I will provide answer of Question number-1 in below.

Q1. Suppose player A and player B are playing the following game. Player A can choose "Up" and "Down", while player B can choose "Left" and "Right". The payoff matrix is depicted below. Player A's payoff is the first entry. Player B's payoff is the second entry. Player A U D Run a. Suppose this is a one-shot, simultaneously-move game, find all the Nash equilibria (pure and mixed). (-25,-4) Player B L (7,5) (1, 1) Q2. Consider this sequential game. Assume the players can only use pure strategies Drive Player 1 Player 2 Walk Run R (1, 1) (4, 10) Fly Walk Swim (10,0) (3,20) (2,10) (1,9) a. Use backward induction to solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.

Q1. Suppose player A and player B are playing the following game. Player A can choose "Up" and "Down", while player B can choose "Left" and "Right". The payoff matrix is depicted below. Player A's payoff is the first entry. Player B's payoff is the second entry. Player A U D Run a. Suppose this is a one-shot, simultaneously-move game, find all the Nash equilibria (pure and mixed). (-25,-4) Player B L (7,5) (1, 1) Q2. Consider this sequential game. Assume the players can only use pure strategies Drive Player 1 Player 2 Walk Run R (1, 1) (4, 10) Fly Walk Swim (10,0) (3,20) (2,10) (1,9) a. Use backward induction to solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.

Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies and Tactics (MindTap Course List)

14th Edition

ISBN:9781305506381

Author:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris

Publisher:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris

Chapter13: best-practice Tactics: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 2E

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Question

Please help with #1

Q1. Suppose player A and player B are playing the following game. Player A can choose "Up" and
"Down", while player B can choose "Left" and "Right". The payoff matrix is depicted below. Player
A's payoff is the first entry. Player B's payoff is the second entry.
Player A
U
D
Player B
L
(7,5)
(1, 1)
a. Suppose this is a one-shot, simultaneously-move game, find all the Nash equilibria (pure and
mixed).
Run
Q2. Consider this sequential game. Assume the players can only use pure strategies
(-25,-4)
R
(1, 1)
(4, 10)
Player 1
Drive
Fly
FA
Player 2
Walk Run
(10,0)
(3, 20)
Walk
Swim
(2,10) (1,9)
a. Use backward induction to solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.

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