Consider the stage game shown in table below. Suppose this game is played twice. Also, assume that players do not discountfuture payoffs. That is, 6₁ = 6₂ = 1.How many SPNEs does the repeated game (where the shown stage game is played twice) have?Player 2LMRU9,96, 111, 12Player 1C11, 65,51, 1D12, 11, 12, 29Numerical answer

The ideal conclusion of a game occurs when there is no incentive to depart from the beginning…

Consider the stage game shown in table below. Suppose this game is played twice. Also, assume that players do not discount future payoffs. That is, 8₁ = ₂ = 1. How many SPNEs does the repeated game (where the shown stage game is played twice) have? Player 2 L M R U 9,9 6, 11 1, 12 Player 1 C 11, 6 5,5 1, 1 D 12, 1 1, 1 2, 2

Consider the stage game shown in table below. Suppose this game is played twice. Also, assume that players do not discount future payoffs. That is, 8₁ = ₂ = 1. How many SPNEs does the repeated game (where the shown stage game is played twice) have? Player 2 L M R U 9,9 6, 11 1, 12 Player 1 C 11, 6 5,5 1, 1 D 12, 1 1, 1 2, 2

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Solve this game using iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Write down your process as well as your final solution. a b d e А 31,-1 | 1,3 |1,0 |32,-2 1,1 B 62,-3 -3,-2 27,-3-3,43 -4,17 с 53,-1 | -1,0 194,-33,-3 |-1,2 D0,-35 -3,37 -4,41 0,-14 -2,15 E -23,-2 -3,86 0,-15 -3,55 -4,7o
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3. Consider the game below. С1 C2 C3 R1 1, 1 4, 6 8, 5 1, 2 5, 4 R2 R3 2, 6 2, 7 7, 6 0, 7 3.1. Does the game have any pure strategy NEs? 3.2. Check whether a mixed strategy NE exists in which A is mixing R1 and R2 with positive probabilities, playing R3 with zero probability, while B is mixing C1 and C3 with positive probabilities while playing C2 with zero probability. [Let (p1,P2, P3) be the probabilities with which A plays (R1, R2,R3) and let (q1,92, 93) be the probabilities with which B plays (C1, C2,C3). Make use of the following NE test: m* is a NE if for every player i, u;(mị , m²¿) = u;(Si, m²¡) for every si E S¡|m¡(sji) > 0 and u¡(m¡ ,m²¡) > u¡(s¡,m;) for every si E S¡ |m¡ (s¡) = 0. Hint: Each player must be indifferent between those of her pure strategies that are used (with positive probability) in her mixed strategy, and unused strategies must not yield a payoff that is higher than the payoff a player gets with her NE (mixed) strategy.] %3D
11. What are the subgame perfect equilibria of the following game? Out In T B 7,21 L R L/R 9,3 1,1 1,1 3,9 (a) (InT, L), (OutB, R) and (OutT+OutB, L + R). (b) (InT, L) and (OutB, R). (c) Out and (InT, L). (d) (InT, L), (OutB, R) and (OutT+OutB, L + R). (e) (InT, L). 2
P1| P2 Left Middle Right Left 4,2 3,3 1,2 Middle 3,3 5,5 2,6 Right 2,1 6,2 3,3 Consider the simultaneous move game represented by this payoff matrix. Suppose that the game is repeated for two periods and the players know that the game will end at the end of two periods. They observe the first period outcome before they move to the second period. Assume that there is no discounting, i.e. 2nd period payoffs are not discounted, or the discount factor is equal to 1. Which of the following outcomes could occur in some subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of this repeated game? Choose True if you think the outcome can be a SPE, otherwise choose False. a) (Left, Left) is played in both periods. b) (Right, Right) is played in both periods. c) (Middle, Middle) is played in both periods. d) (Middle, Middle) is played in the first period, followed by (Left, Left). e) (Middle, Middle) is played in the first period, followed by (Right, Right).
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Chegg Home Expert Q&A My solutions Question 18 3 pts Consider the non-repeating game depicted in the following payoff matrix Player One \table[[Player Two,,,otion B], [Option C, 30, 100, 0, 500], [Option D, 40, 300,, 200]] Which outcome is the Maximax equilibrium? 80,200 50, 500 30, 100 40, 300 C Question 18 Consider the non-repeating game depicted in the following payoff matrix Player One Option A Option B Player Two Option C 30, 100 50, 500 Option D 40, 300 80, 200 Which outcome is the Maximax equilibrium? O 80, 200 O 50, 500 O 30,100 O 40, 300 3 pts 8 ▾
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Consider the following game: p 2,10 0,5 5,2 0,5 5,10 Which of the following is FALSE for the SPE of this game? a. If p in [0.6, 1], then playing x is an equilibrim strategy for player 1 b. If p in [0, 0.6], then playing y is an equilibrim strategy for player 1 C. For all possible p values in [0,1], playing x is an equilibrium strategy for player 1 y y R Nature 1 2 1-p y R X 2,10
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