Consider the stage game shown in table below. Suppose this game is played twice. Also, assume that players do not discountfuture payoffs. That is, 8₁ = 82 = 1.How many SPNEs does the repeated game (where the shown stage game is played twice) have?Player 2LRU9,96, 111, 12Player 111, 65,51, 112, 11, 12, 2Numerical answerCD

Subgame perfect equilibrium refers to the dynamic game where the players choose pay-offs that is…

Consider the stage game shown in table below. Suppose this game is played twice. Also, assume that players do not discount future payoffs. That is, 6₁ = √2 = 1. How many SPNEs does the repeated game (where the shown stage game is played twice) have? Player 1 C D L 9,9 11, 6 12, 1 Player 2 6, 11 5,5 1, 1 R 1, 12 1, 1 2,2

Consider the stage game shown in table below. Suppose this game is played twice. Also, assume that players do not discount future payoffs. That is, 6₁ = √2 = 1. How many SPNEs does the repeated game (where the shown stage game is played twice) have? Player 1 C D L 9,9 11, 6 12, 1 Player 2 6, 11 5,5 1, 1 R 1, 12 1, 1 2,2

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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P1| P2 Left Middle Right Left 4,2 3,3 1,2 Middle 3,3 5,5 2,6 Right 2,1 6,2 3,3 Consider the simultaneous move game represented by this payoff matrix. Suppose that the game is repeated for two periods and the players know that the game will end at the end of two periods. They observe the first period outcome before they move to the second period. Assume that there is no discounting, i.e. 2nd period payoffs are not discounted, or the discount factor is equal to 1. Which of the following outcomes could occur in some subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of this repeated game? Choose True if you think the outcome can be a SPE, otherwise choose False. a) (Left, Left) is played in both periods. b) (Right, Right) is played in both periods. c) (Middle, Middle) is played in both periods. d) (Middle, Middle) is played in the first period, followed by (Left, Left). e) (Middle, Middle) is played in the first period, followed by (Right, Right).
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Consider the following game: p 2,10 0,5 5,2 0,5 5,10 Which of the following is FALSE for the SPE of this game? a. If p in [0.6, 1], then playing x is an equilibrim strategy for player 1 b. If p in [0, 0.6], then playing y is an equilibrim strategy for player 1 C. For all possible p values in [0,1], playing x is an equilibrium strategy for player 1 y y R Nature 1 2 1-p y R X 2,10
Paramter y = 0 If ⟨a, d⟩ is played in the first period and ⟨b, e⟩ is played in the second period, whatis the resulting (repeated game) payoff for the row player?
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