Consider the following Stackelberg duopoly. Both firms produce a homogenous good. Firm 1 chooses how much to supplyfirst. Firm 2 chooses how much to supply after observing the quantity supplied by firm 1. The market demand isQ= 100 – 4 P. For firm i, the total cost of production is TC(q) =5q,+2. What is the optimal quantity supplied by firm1210203040QUESTION 6Consider the following Stackelberg duopoly. Both produce a homogenous good. Firm 1 chooses how much to supplyfirst. Firm 2 chooses how much to supply after observing the quantity supplied from firm 1. The market demand isQ= 100 - 4P. For firm i, the total cost of production is TC(q) =5q,+2. What is the market clearing price?O 10O 1520O 25

An oligopoly is a market structure in which a small number of firms dominating the market. The…

Consider the following Stackelberg duopoly. Both firms produce a homogenous good. Firm 1 chooses how much to supply first. Firm 2 chooses how much to supply after observing the quantity supplied by firm 1. The market demand is Q= 100 – 4P. For firm i, the total cost of production is TC(q = 5q;+2. What is the optimal quantity supplied by firm 1? O 10 O 20 30 O 40 QUESTION 6 Consider the following Stackelberg duopoly. Both pròduce a homogenous good. Firm 1 chooses how much to supply first. Firm 2 chooses how much to supply after observing the quantity supplied from firm 1. The market demand is Q= 100 - 4P. For firm i, the total cost of production is TC(q)= 5q,+2. What is the market clearing price? O 10 15 20 O 25 O O O O

Consider the following Stackelberg duopoly. Both firms produce a homogenous good. Firm 1 chooses how much to supply first. Firm 2 chooses how much to supply after observing the quantity supplied by firm 1. The market demand is Q= 100 – 4P. For firm i, the total cost of production is TC(q = 5q;+2. What is the optimal quantity supplied by firm 1? O 10 O 20 30 O 40 QUESTION 6 Consider the following Stackelberg duopoly. Both pròduce a homogenous good. Firm 1 chooses how much to supply first. Firm 2 chooses how much to supply after observing the quantity supplied from firm 1. The market demand is Q= 100 - 4P. For firm i, the total cost of production is TC(q)= 5q,+2. What is the market clearing price? O 10 15 20 O 25 O O O O

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

O 10-Q O 10-20 QUESTION 2 A non-competitive firm's demand curve is P = 10- 4Q. So its MR is O 5-20 O10-4Q N 10-8Q 05-Q OC QUESTION 3 For a non-competitive firm with a demand curve P = 1800-2Q and marginal costs of (Q)? 360 (400
9. Two firms compete by choosing price. Their demand functions are q1 = 20 – pı + P2 and q2 = 20 – P2 + P1. Marginal costs are zero a) Suppose the two firms set their prices at the same time. Find the resulting NE. What 2 price will each firm charge, how much will it sell, and what will its profit be? b) Suppose Firm 1 sets its price first and then Firm 2 sets its price. What price will each firm charge, how much will it sell, and what will its profit be? c) Suppose there are three ways this game can be played: both firms set price at the same time; firm 1 sets its price first; firm 2 sets its price first. If firm 1 can choose among these options, which would it prefer?
A market with N=20 identical firms compete on quantity (Cournot competition). The market price elasticity of demand is = −1.5, and the price elasticity of supply for N-1 of the firms is n-i = 1.5. What is the price elasticity of the residual demand curve facing firm i? O -30 O -50 O -58.5 O -60
The tables below show reservation values of buyers and sellers in a market. There are three buyers and two sellers. Each buyer's reservation values for the fourth unit and above are negative, and each seller can produce at most four units. First unit Second unit Third unit First unit Second unit Third unit Fourth unit Buyers' Reservation Values Buyer 1 Buyer 2 Buyer 3 65 35 65 50 25 35 25 0 25 Sellers' Reservation Values Seller 1 Seller 2 5 5 10 10 45 30 60 45 16) Refer to the tables above. What is the range of equilibrium prices? What is the equilibrium quantity? A) $25 and $30; 4 units C) $35 and $45: 6 units B) $30 and $35; 5 units D) $25 and $45; 5 units 16)
Firm A and B both produce good Q. Demand is Q-45-0.5P, where P is price. Both firms have total cost TC = 6 + 16Q₁, where i A,B. If the firms collude to produce the monopoly output, the resulting consumer surplus is? O342.25 O 354.75 O 362.22 370.74
Price $10 8 O 4 2 MR Supply Demand I 1 0 2 4 6 8 10 Quantity Refer to the figure above. If the market had been competitive but was taken over by a cartel, as depicted in the figure above, then we would expect output to increase from 5 to 10. increase from 3 to 6. decrease from 6 to 3. decrease from 5 to 2.
#2
Assume there are two firms, firm A and B, engaged in Cournot competition. The industry demand curve is given by P = 60-Q, where Q = QA+QB denotes industry output. Each firm faces a marginal cost of production equal to $30. In equilibrium, what will be the output level of firm A? O O O O 10 20 30 40
A firm faces the demand schedule q = 400 - 2p - p². What price does it need to charge to sell 100 units? O £16.35 O £15.53 O £18.23 O None
An amusement park decides to apply two-part tariff rule to set price, given the demand equation P-6-2.5Q and MC =$1. Based on equilibrium price (P) and quantity (Q), how much is the maximum upfront fee the park could charge each visitor? (please review notes on 'Consumer value (refer to slides 1, 2, and 3)) O $0.75. Ⓒ$1.0. O $1.25. O $1.5.
Suppose there are two firms in an industry and the inverse demand function for the industry is: P = 45 - 20 Assume that the MC functions for the two firms are: MC1 = 15 MC2 = 12 What is the price under Courbet model? O 15 O 24 O 30 O 36 O 21
25