Consider the following Cournot duopoly. Both firms produce a homogenous good. The demand function is Q = 100 - 2P, where Q is the total quantity produced. Firm 1's cost function is TC(q,) =591 + 1. Firm 2's marginal cost of production is c = 6 with probability 0.5 and = 3 with probability 0.5. Firm 2 knows its own cost function and firm 1's cost function. Firm 1 knows its own cost function and the probability distribution of firm 2's marginal cost. How much does firm 2 produce in a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium? O 175/6 if the marginal cost is high and 193/6 if the marginal cost is low O 86/3 if the marginal cost is high and 98/6 if the marginal cost is low O 92/3 O 98/6
Consider the following Cournot duopoly. Both firms produce a homogenous good. The demand function is Q = 100 - 2P, where Q is the total quantity produced. Firm 1's cost function is TC(q,) =591 + 1. Firm 2's marginal cost of production is c = 6 with probability 0.5 and = 3 with probability 0.5. Firm 2 knows its own cost function and firm 1's cost function. Firm 1 knows its own cost function and the probability distribution of firm 2's marginal cost. How much does firm 2 produce in a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium? O 175/6 if the marginal cost is high and 193/6 if the marginal cost is low O 86/3 if the marginal cost is high and 98/6 if the marginal cost is low O 92/3 O 98/6
Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies and Tactics (MindTap Course List)
14th Edition
ISBN:9781305506381
Author:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris
Publisher:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris
Chapter13: best-practice Tactics: Game Theory
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1E
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![Consider the following Cournot duopoly. Both firms produce a homogenous good. The demand function is Q = 100 -2P, where Q is the total quantity
produced. Firm 1's cost function is TC(q,)=59, + 1. Firm 2's marginal cost of production is c =6 with probability 0.5 and
c5 =3 with probability 0.5.
Firm 2 knows its own cost function and firm 1's cost function. Firm 1 knows its own cost function and the probability distribution of firm 2's marginal cost. How
much does firm 2 produce in a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium?
O 175/6 if the marginal cost is high and 193/6 if the marginal cost is low
O 86/3 if the marginal cost is high and 98/6 if the marginal cost is low
O 92/3
98/6](/v2/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcontent.bartleby.com%2Fqna-images%2Fquestion%2Fba3d901e-3931-418a-bb9d-287ac8397bcb%2Fa369646a-c4ba-4cf2-890d-50339ef3c309%2Fewhhxyf_processed.jpeg&w=3840&q=75)
Transcribed Image Text:Consider the following Cournot duopoly. Both firms produce a homogenous good. The demand function is Q = 100 -2P, where Q is the total quantity
produced. Firm 1's cost function is TC(q,)=59, + 1. Firm 2's marginal cost of production is c =6 with probability 0.5 and
c5 =3 with probability 0.5.
Firm 2 knows its own cost function and firm 1's cost function. Firm 1 knows its own cost function and the probability distribution of firm 2's marginal cost. How
much does firm 2 produce in a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium?
O 175/6 if the marginal cost is high and 193/6 if the marginal cost is low
O 86/3 if the marginal cost is high and 98/6 if the marginal cost is low
O 92/3
98/6
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