Two firms compete in a market to sell a homogeneous product with inverse demand function P = 400 – 2Q. Each firm produces at a constant marginal cost of $50 and has no fixed costs -- both firms have a cost function C(Q) = 50Q. If this market is defined as a Stackelberg Oligopoly, what is the optimal amount for the leader (firm 1) to produce? (Round to one decimal place) If this market is defined as a Stackelberg Oligopoly, what is the optimal amount for the follower (firm 2) to produce? (Round to one decimal place) What is the market price? (Round to the nearest whole number) What are the leader's (firm 1's) profits? (Round to the nearest whole number) What are the follower's (firm 2's) profits? (Round to the nearest whole number)
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Two firms compete in a market to sell a homogeneous product with inverse demand function P = 400 – 2Q. Each firm produces at a constant marginal cost of $50 and has no fixed costs -- both firms have a cost function C(Q) = 50Q.
If this market is defined as a Stackelberg Oligopoly, what is the optimal amount for the leader (firm 1) to produce? (Round to one decimal place)
If this market is defined as a Stackelberg Oligopoly, what is the optimal amount for the follower (firm 2) to produce? (Round to one decimal place)
What is the market price? (Round to the nearest whole number)
What are the leader's (firm 1's) profits? (Round to the nearest whole number)
What are the follower's (firm 2's) profits? (Round to the nearest whole number)
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