You are given the market demand functionQ = 1500-1000p,and that each duopoly firm's marginal cost is $0.20 per unit, which implies the cost function:C(qi) = 0.20qi,assuming no fixed costs for i = 1, 2.The cooperative Cournot quantities are q₁and 92 =The cooperative Cournot price is $ (round to the nearest penny).Calculate the cooperative Cournot profits: firm 1 $and firm 2 $(enter your responses as whole numbers).(round both responses to the nearest cent).

When the two firms in a duopoly cooperate they maximize their joint profits .

You are given the market demand function Q = 1500-1000p, and that each duopoly firm's marginal cost is $0.20 per unit, which implies the cost function: C(qi) = 0.20qi, assuming no fixed costs for i = 1, 2. The cooperative Cournot quantities are q₁ = and q₂ = (enter your responses as whole numbers). The cooperative Cournot price is $ (round to the nearest penny). Calculate the cooperative Cournot profits: firm 1 $ and firm 2 $ (round both responses to the nearest cent).

You are given the market demand function Q = 1500-1000p, and that each duopoly firm's marginal cost is $0.20 per unit, which implies the cost function: C(qi) = 0.20qi, assuming no fixed costs for i = 1, 2. The cooperative Cournot quantities are q₁ = and q₂ = (enter your responses as whole numbers). The cooperative Cournot price is $ (round to the nearest penny). Calculate the cooperative Cournot profits: firm 1 $ and firm 2 $ (round both responses to the nearest cent).

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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