The inverse demand for a homogeneous-product Stackelberg duopoly is P= 24,000 -5Q. The coststructures for the leader and the follower, respectively, are CL(QL) = 3,000QL and CF(QH = 4,000QF.a. What is the follower's reaction function?QF=|0.5 QLb. Determine the equilibrium output level for both the leader and the follower.Leader output:Follower output:

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The inverse demand for a homogeneous-product Stackelberg duopoly is P= 24,000 -5Q. The cost structures for the leader and the follower, respectively, are CL(QL) = 3,000QL and CF(QA = 4,000G a. What is the follower's reaction function? 0.5 QL o. Determine the equilibrium output level for both the leader and the follower. Leader output | Follower output: |

The inverse demand for a homogeneous-product Stackelberg duopoly is P= 24,000 -5Q. The cost structures for the leader and the follower, respectively, are CL(QL) = 3,000QL and CF(QA = 4,000G a. What is the follower's reaction function? 0.5 QL o. Determine the equilibrium output level for both the leader and the follower. Leader output | Follower output: |

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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(Preferably answered digitally as I have a hard time understanding paper hand writing.)