Consider that two major airlines, Delta Air Lines and American Airlines, operate on a competitive route from New York to Los Angeles. Both airlines offer similar services, have comparable cost structures, and regularly interact in the market where they can choose to set either high fares (cooperative pricing) or low fares (competitive pricing). Each airline's profit for this route depends on the pricing strategy chosen by both airlines as described by the following payoff matrix: Strategy High Fare American Airlines High Fare ($ million) Low Fare ($ million) (10, 10) Delta Air Lines ($ million) Low Fare ($ million) (2,40) (40, 2) (8,8) Now consider that the airlines compete repeatedly and they both use a trigger strategy to maintain high fares over time. Specifically, with this strategy,each airline agrees to set high fares as long as the other airline does the same. However, if any airline undercuts by setting a low fare, the other responds by setting low fares indefinitely as punishment. If the discount factor (interest rate) is 8%, then the present value of cheating is cooperating is million dollars, and the present value of A million dollars.