2.Consider a society made up of three people—Dan (D), Erin (E), and Fred (F).The society must choose between three immigration policies—ClosedBorders (C), Open Borders (O), and Regulated Immigration (R). Supposepreferences are as follows:R>D C>DOCZERZE O0>FR>FC.(a) Write down an ideological ordering on the alternative such that thisissue is described by that ideology.(b) What is the preferred policy of the median voter under that ideology?(c) Use this fact to make an argument for why pursuing that policy might beconsidered serving the public interest in this setting.(d) Make an argument for why you might nonetheless reject the idea thatthis policy is clearly in the public interest or explain why you think thereis no such argument.

Libertarians: O > R > CConservatives: R > C > OProgressives: C > R > O…

Answered: Consider a society made up of three…

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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There are two goods, Computers and Wheat, and two factors of production, capital and labor. Production in both sectors satisfies constant returns to scale. Production of computers is relatively more capital-intensive. Both input and final goods markets are competitive. Goods are freely traded internationally, but factors are immobile across countries. We will focus our analysis on the Home country. In the initial equilibrium, the Home country produces both computers and wheat, but only exports wheat. In our analysis, we will consider the following sequence of time-frames: In the short run, both factors are completely specific to their initial sectors of employ- ment. (i.c. both factors are used to produce both goods, but in the short run it is impossible to relocate the factors that are currently in use for production) . In the medium run, capital is specific but labor can relocate. . In the long run, both factors are mobile across sectors. • In each run, the prices of factors adjust…
Consider the claim that the market interaction of individually rational agents leads to an outcome that is socially rational. Address the following questions: In what sense is the above claim true? Explain what means that agents are individually rational and that the market outcome is socially rational as part of your answer. Identify at least two essential conditions that a market must satisfy for the claim to be true. (i.e.: the conditions must be necessary and sufficient for the claim to be true). Explain why the claim should be true when these two conditions are satisfied. Explain why the claim would no longer be true for markets that do not satisfy these two conditions, separately focusing on each one of the cases in which the claim is not true. For those cases in which the claim is not true, describe government interventions that may help the market outcome to become socially rational in some sense.
Outlining examples, provide a short (economic) definition of each of these terms, which have been suggested as having a role to play in resolving social dilemmas.a) Altruismb) Reciprocityc) Punishmentsd) Social norms Answer all, please.
John and Sotiris live on trees in two different forests. They each have eight hours to work in a day. John can grow a Yam in 1 hour or raise a Zebra in 2 hours. Sotiris can grow a Yam in 2 hours or raise a Zebra in 4 hours. Both John and Sotiris consume equal numbers of Yams and Zebras. When calculating the welfare benefits of markets, the standard analysis only includes the parties involved in exchange. Using the American Opioid Crisis as an example, explain how poorly regulated markets can cause harm to third parties not involved in exchange.
Utility. Suppose we have two cities, 1 and 2. Assume every individual has the same utility function given by: u(w;,r;) = 4 * WJ - 0.75 * r; where j = 1 or j = 2. Furthermore, for all parts of the problem assume the total population is fixed at 1, 000 and wages in each city are given by: W1 = 15W2 = 12 (a) What is the utility from each choice if r1 = 20 and 1'2 = 15. Is this an equilibrium? How do you know? (b) For the rest of the problem you can now assume that rents are increasing in the population of each city. Specifically, assume r1(L1) = 4 * L1 and T2 (L2) = 8 * L2. Compute the equilibrium population of each city equilibrium rents.
Problem 5: Consider an economy with production. The production functions for goods X and Y are given by: Y = = La Ly ဇာ where Lx +Ly = I. The utility function of the representative consumer is given by: U (x, y) = min {}} where all the parameters are positive. Determine the Walrasian equilibrium quantities of X and Y produced and sold in this economy.
Consider an Edgeworth box economy where preferences are given by u'lx},x3) = x} + Inx and uaf,x3) = xi, and the initial endowments are e' = (1,3) and e² = (3,1). Find all the Walrasian equilibrium. You may assume that the solution is inte- rior.
Consider a two-person exchange economy in which person 1 owns 200 units of x and 100 units of y while person 2 owns 100 units of x and 200 units y. Suppose their preferences over the two goods can be represented as: U1 (x, y) = y + 50Inx U2 (x, y) = y + 150lnx 1. How much of x do they trade among each other? 2. Does the First Welfare Theorem (FWT) hold in this economy?
Angela works on farmland owned by Bruno. The diagram illustrates their joint feasible frontier. Angela's indifference curves are all assumed to have an identical slope, for any given amount of free time. This means that they are all parallel. Angela and Bruno can bargain costlessly. Bushels of grain 8 12 Angela's reservation indifference curve, IC₁ IC₂ D 0 0 16 Angela's hours of free time 20 24 Feasible frontier: Angela and Bruno combined a) Assume that Angela's reservation option is at point F. Explain the meaning of "Pareto efficient" and give two ways that we know that point F is not Pareto-efficient. Explain why moving between point F and point E would not improve efficiency. (4 marks) b) How might Angela and Bruno achieve a Pareto-efficient outcome? Explain how the negotiation might work. Use indifference curves to show where this outcome will be on the diagram. (3 marks) c) Explain why it would not be Pareto-efficient to simply aim to produce the maximum total amount of grain,…
Can you please answer Q4?
In a standard economic model, we generally assume the individual only cares about their own payoff. So, for example, utility of individual i is given by u = pi, where pi is the individual’s payoff. Suppose the individual is playing a dictator game with another partner j. How would you modify the utility function to explain the non-zero allocations to the partner that are typically observed?
Q.3 (a) Provide a formal rigorous-proof of Sen's theorem that Liberalism and Pareto Optimality are incompatible. (b) Consider an economy with 15 consumers and 2 goods. Consumer 3 has utility function U³ = X₁ + X2 At a certain Pareto efficient allocation, consumer 3 has an allocation (10, 0). What can you say about the competitive prices that support this Pareto Optimal allocation? Explain your answer.

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