Consider a first-price sealed-bid auction with a reserve price. A single indivisible object is to be allocated. The reserve price r2 0 is a number set by the auctioneer in advance and known by participants. Each participant submits a bid inside a sealed envelope. The bids are submitted simultaneously and independently. The auctioneer collects all bids and selects the highest one highest bid is no smaller than the reserve price, then the person with the highest bid pays the to the auctioneer and gets the object. Otherwise, if all the bids are smaller than the reserve pr then the auctioneer keeps the object and none of the participants pays anything. (a) Write down a game representing the sealed-bid first-price auction. You can assume that pe have quasilinear utility over money. (b) Suppose that r= 0, is overbidding weakly dominated? Justify your answer. (c) Suppose that r = 0, is underbidding weakly dominated by truthful bidding? Justify your ans (d) How would your answer to (b) and (c) change if r> 0?

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
14th Edition
ISBN:9780190931919
Author:NEWNAN
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Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
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Consider a first-price sealed-bid auction with a reserve price. A single indivisible object is to be
allocated. The reserve price r> 0 is a number set by the auctioneer in advance and known by all the
participants. Each participant submits a bid inside a sealed envelope. The bids are submitted
simultaneously and independently. The auctioneer collects all bids and selects the highest one. If the
highest bid is no smaller than the reserve price, then the person with the highest bid pays their bid
to the auctioneer and gets the object. Otherwise, if all the bids are smaller than the reserve price,
then the auctioneer keeps the object and none of the participants pays anything.
(a) Write down a game representing the sealed-bid first-price auction. You can assume that people
have quasilinear utility over money.
(b) Suppose that r = 0, is overbidding weakly dominated? Justify your answer.
(c) Suppose that r = 0, is underbidding weakly dominated by truthful bidding? Justify your answer.
(d) How would your answer to (b) and (c) change if r> 0?
Transcribed Image Text:Consider a first-price sealed-bid auction with a reserve price. A single indivisible object is to be allocated. The reserve price r> 0 is a number set by the auctioneer in advance and known by all the participants. Each participant submits a bid inside a sealed envelope. The bids are submitted simultaneously and independently. The auctioneer collects all bids and selects the highest one. If the highest bid is no smaller than the reserve price, then the person with the highest bid pays their bid to the auctioneer and gets the object. Otherwise, if all the bids are smaller than the reserve price, then the auctioneer keeps the object and none of the participants pays anything. (a) Write down a game representing the sealed-bid first-price auction. You can assume that people have quasilinear utility over money. (b) Suppose that r = 0, is overbidding weakly dominated? Justify your answer. (c) Suppose that r = 0, is underbidding weakly dominated by truthful bidding? Justify your answer. (d) How would your answer to (b) and (c) change if r> 0?
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