2. A 6-foot sub valued at $25 is divided among five players (P1, P2, P3, P4, P5) using the last diminisher method. The players play in a fixed order, with P1 first, P2 second, and so on. I round 1, P1 makes the first cut and makes a claim on a C-piece. For each of the remaining players, the value of the current C-piece at the time it is their turn is given in the following table: Player 2 Player 3 Player 4 Player 5 Value of current $4 $6 $5.50 $7.50 С piece | In the second round, Player 1 makes the initial cut and claims the piece, and the current values in round 2 are shown below. Player 2 Player 3 Player 4 Value of $7 $4.50 $3 current C-piece h) Who gets the piece at the end of round 2? Explain your reasoning here: i) What is the value of the piece?

2. A 6-foot sub valued at $25 is divided among five players (P1, P2, P3, P4, P5) using the last diminisher method. The players play in a fixed order, with P1 first, P2 second, and so on. I round 1, P1 makes the first cut and makes a claim on a C-piece. For each of the remaining players, the value of the current C-piece at the time it is their turn is given in the following table: Player 2 Player 3 Player 4 Player 5 Value of current $4 $6 $5.50 $7.50 С piece | In the second round, Player 1 makes the initial cut and claims the piece, and the current values in round 2 are shown below. Player 2 Player 3 Player 4 Value of $7 $4.50 $3 current C-piece h) Who gets the piece at the end of round 2? Explain your reasoning here: i) What is the value of the piece?

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

Example 1: Zero Sum Game Game Table 2 Game Table 1 Player 2 Player 2 S1 S2 Si S2 RI (3,-3) (-5,5) Player 1 R1 3 -5 RI (0,0) (7,-7) R1 7 Player 1 All players payoff shown =) Fnd Nasn ewwliLtlun> zero sum shorthand
A game is played as follows: First Player 1 decides (Y or N) whether or not to play.If she chooses N, the game ends. If she chooses Y, then Player 2 decides (Y or N) whetheror not to play. If he chooses N the game ends. If he chooses Y, then they go ahead and playanother game with the payoffs shown below. A player who opts out by choosing N gets 2 andthe other player gets 0. Draw the tree of this game and then find the two subgame-perfect Nashequilibria.
There are 2 players. They take Ston eS From the Pilt of 6 Stones. Player 1 can takt only 2 or 3 Stones. piayer 2 can taKeS only 2 or 4 StonesS. P layers take turns, observe dil Previous moves, and player 1 mover first. A pla yer loses if She can not make a legal move, While another player ir declared the Winner. Let the pay oF OF Winning egval to 1 and the payoFF OF losing equal to 0. a) represent the in ɛxtemsive Form (depict Only legalmoes) b) Find all SPNE OF this game& explain your a mwwer. Who Will Win ? game Only legalmar)
3. Find the saddle point, if it exists, for the following game. (b) Solve the following game by using the principle of dominance and find the probabilities of strategies for each player and the value of the game. Player B Player A II III IV V 3 4 4 II 2 4 III 4 4 IV 4 4 20 2420 8760
Player 1 Cooperate (C) Defect (D) O Cooperate (C) 3,3 8,0 0 Player 2 Suppose the game is repeated infinitely many times, and 2 plays a grim trigger strategy (cooperates as long as 1 cooperates, but defects forever after 1 defects). What is the value of 1's future payoffs if 1 defects today and then best-responds to 2? Assume that the discount factor is still 0.5 (i.e. payoffs in the next period are worth half as much as payoffs today). 01 02 8 O 9 Defect (D) 0,8 1,1 If the game is repeated infinitely many times, what is the smallest discount factor that would support cooperation in Nash equilibrium? O 1/2 O 5/7 3/8
Two politicians from the same party decide whether to support or oppose the gov- ernment's environmental policy. Politician A prefers that they both support, but Politician B prefers that they both oppose. Both politicians agree that the party should have a coherent position and the worst outcome is that one supports and the other opposes the policy. (a) Formulate this situation as a strategic game - specify the players, actions, and payoffs (you can set-up a table of the actions and payoffs). (b) What are the Nash equilibria of this game? Explain your answer.
1\2 U D L 4,3 0,0 R 0,0 2,1 C 1,4 0,0 Q. Suppose players 1 and 2 play the stage game depicted above. Check whether each of these strategies constitute a SPE? 1. Play U,C in Rounds 1 and 2 2. Play D,R in rounds 1 and 2 each 3. Play U,L in Round 1 followed by U,C in Round 2. If Player 2 defects punish by playing D,R in round 2. 4. Alternate between U,C and D,R in Rounds 1 and 2
Exercise 6.8. Consider the following extensive-form game with cardinal payoffs: 1 R O player pay 000 2 1 M 3 b 010 O player 3's payoff 1 2 221 2 000 0 0 (a) Find all the pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Which ones are also subgame perfect? (b) [This is a more challenging question] Prove that there is no mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium where Player 1 plays Mwith probability strictly between 0 and 1.
Question Completion Status: Gekko QUESTION 8 Good Quality a Poor Quality SERDE 1 INSGE 19 2 Good Quality Wonka 10 Gekko = 10 Wonka = 12 Gekko = 9 1 Wonka Refer to Table 17-7. Wonka and Gekko agree to cooperate so as to maximize total profit. If this game is played repeatedly and Wonka uses a tit- strategy, it will choose a O a. good quality product in the first round and in subsequent rounds it will choose whatever Gekko chose in the previous round. O b. poor quality product in all rounds, regardless of the choice made by Gekko. C. good quality product in all rounds, regardless of the choice made by Gekko. d. poor quality product in the first round and in subsequent rounds it will choose whatever Gekko chose in the previous round. Poor Quality Wonka = 9 Gekko = 12 Click Save and Submit to save and submit. Click Save All Answers to save all answers. Wonka = 11 Gekko = 11 O Pleshow! www 0 R Aa
First Player can invest $1.00 with Second Player. Second Player chooses whether tc cooperate and make the promised investment, or appropriate and keep First Player'a $1.00. Based on the payoff matrix shown below (first player payoffs on bottom left of cell, second player payoffa on upper right of cell), what will be First Player's payoff if contracis are not enforceable? Second Player Cooperate Appropriate Invest 1.5 1.0 First Player 1.5 -1.0 Don't Invest
a W 3,5 3,4 8,4 0,0 3,3 8,9 y 0,1 5,9 9,8 Describe a strategy for player 1 that dominates x. O (1/3.0. 2/3) 1.0,0) O01.1) to
Consider this extensive form game. The top number is player 1’s payoff, themiddle number is player 2’s payoff, and the bottom number is player 3’spayoff.a. Describe the general form of a strategy for each player.b. Find the SPNE.