2. A 6-foot sub valued at $25 is divided among five players (P1, P2, P3, P4, P5) using the last diminisher method. The players play in a fixed order, with P1 first, P2 second, and so on. I round 1, P1 makes the first cut and makes a claim on a C-piece. For each of the remaining players, the value of the current C-piece at the time it is their turn is given in the following table: Player 2 Player 3 Player 4 Player 5 Value of current $4 $6 $5.50 $7.50 С piece | In the second round, Player 1 makes the initial cut and claims the piece, and the current values in round 2 are shown below. Player 2 Player 3 Player 4 Value of $7 $4.50 $3 current C-piece h) Who gets the piece at the end of round 2? Explain your reasoning here: i) What is the value of the piece?

2. A 6-foot sub valued at $25 is divided among five players (P1, P2, P3, P4, P5) using the last diminisher method. The players play in a fixed order, with P1 first, P2 second, and so on. I round 1, P1 makes the first cut and makes a claim on a C-piece. For each of the remaining players, the value of the current C-piece at the time it is their turn is given in the following table: Player 2 Player 3 Player 4 Player 5 Value of current $4 $6 $5.50 $7.50 С piece | In the second round, Player 1 makes the initial cut and claims the piece, and the current values in round 2 are shown below. Player 2 Player 3 Player 4 Value of $7 $4.50 $3 current C-piece h) Who gets the piece at the end of round 2? Explain your reasoning here: i) What is the value of the piece?

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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