A cake valued at $90 is divided among five players (P1, P2, P3, P4, P5) using the last diminisher method. The players play in a fixed order, withP1 first, P2 second, and so on. In round 1, P1 makes the first cut and makes a claim on a C-piece. For each of the remaining players, the value ofthe current C-piece at the time it is their turn is given in the following table:Player 2Value of current C-piece $19.00O aPlayer 3$17.50Which player gets his or her share at the end of round 1 and round 2?What is the value of the share to the players receiving the share?ObO cOdPlayer 4$15.00Round 1: Player 2, approximate value $19.00Round 2: Player 5, value $18.00Round 1: Player 5, value $18.00Round 2: Player 2, value $18.00Round 1: Player 2, approximate value $19.00Round 2: Player 5, value $18.00Round 1: Player 5, approximate value $19.50Round 2: Player 2, value $18.00Player 5$19.50

There are five players on the team, each with a cake value.At the end of round 1, their current C…

A Cake valued at $90 is divided among five players (P1, P2, P3, P4, PS) using the last diminisher method. The players play in a fixed order, with P1 first, P2 second, and so on. In round 1, P1 makes the first cut and makes a claim on a C-piece. For each of the remaining players, the value of the current C-piece at the time it is their turn is given in the following table: Player 2 Value of current C-piece $19.00 Player 3 $17.50 O a Ob Oc Od Which player gets his or her share at the end of round 1 and round 2? What is the value of the share to the players receiving the share? Round 1: Player 2, approximate value $19.00 Round 2: Player 5, value $18.00 Round 1: Player 5, value $18.00 Round 2: Player 2, value $18.00 Round 1: Player 2, approximate value $19.00 Round 2: Player 5, value $18.00 Player 4 $15.00 Round 1: Player 5, approximate value $19.50 Round 2: Player 2, value $18.00 Player 5 $19.50

A Cake valued at $90 is divided among five players (P1, P2, P3, P4, PS) using the last diminisher method. The players play in a fixed order, with P1 first, P2 second, and so on. In round 1, P1 makes the first cut and makes a claim on a C-piece. For each of the remaining players, the value of the current C-piece at the time it is their turn is given in the following table: Player 2 Value of current C-piece $19.00 Player 3 $17.50 O a Ob Oc Od Which player gets his or her share at the end of round 1 and round 2? What is the value of the share to the players receiving the share? Round 1: Player 2, approximate value $19.00 Round 2: Player 5, value $18.00 Round 1: Player 5, value $18.00 Round 2: Player 2, value $18.00 Round 1: Player 2, approximate value $19.00 Round 2: Player 5, value $18.00 Player 4 $15.00 Round 1: Player 5, approximate value $19.50 Round 2: Player 2, value $18.00 Player 5 $19.50

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

Cameron and Luke are playing a game called ”Race to 10”. Cameron goes first, and the players take turns choosing either 1 or 2. In each turn, they add the new number to a running total. The player who brings the total to exactly 10 wins the game. a) If both Cameron and Luke play optimally, who will win the game? Does the game have a first-mover advantage or a second-mover advantage? b) Suppose the game is modified to ”Race to 11” (i.e, the player who reaches 11 first wins). Who will win the game if both players play their optimal strategies? What if the game is ”Race to 12”? Does the result change? c) Consider the general version of the game called ”Race to n,” where n is a positive integer greater than 0. What are the conditions on n such that the game has a first mover advantage? What are the conditions on n such that the game has a second mover advantage?
A crime is witnessed by 3 citizens. Every citizen would like the police to be informed about the crime, but prefers that someone else reports it (filing a report is a hassle). Each of the three citizens chooses simultaneously (and independently) whether to call the police or not. When no one makes a call, every citizen receives payoff 0. If at least one citizen calls the police, citizens who call get payoff 5, and those who don't call get payoff 9. (a) Find all Nash equilibria in pure strategies. (b) Compute a symmetric Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies (i.e., an equilibrium in which every citizen calls with the same probability p E (0, 1)). (c) Does the game have a Nash equilibrium in pure or mixed strategies different from those you identified in (a) and (b)? If yes, construct one. If not, argue why not.
This is a 2-part question that requires the answer before in order to answer the next one. Thank you for your time.
Which of the above 4 statements is CORRECT?
Player 1 is an Internet service provider and Player 2 is a potential customer. They consider entering into a contract of service for a period of time. The provider decides between two levels of service: High or Low. The potential customer decides whether to Buy or Not Buy. When the potential customer calls customer service, the Internet service provider makes the initial offer.The potential customer then decides whether to Buy or Not Buy. Let’s say that the interaction ends after the potential customer makes their decision. Please set up the extensive form according to the following outcomes: i. If the Internet service provider offers Low and the potential customer doesn’t buy, they both make off with 1. ii. If the Internet service provider offers Low and the potential customer buys, the Internet service provider makes off with 3, and the customer receives 0. iii. If the Internet service provider offers High and the potential customer doesn’t buy, the Internet service provider makes…
There are three players who must each choose an “effort” level from 1 to 7, that is, Si = {1, 2, 3, ..., 7}. The payoff for each player i is ui(si, s−i) = 10 max{s1, s2, s3} − si. How many pure- strategy Nash equilibria are there? Select one: a.2 b.4 c.none of the other answers d.3 e.1
In Homework 1, we saw that there is no strict dominant strategy equilibrium in an inspection game. Thus, the players must randomize and play a mixed strategy in equilibrium. Suppose the agent shirks with probability p₁ and works with probability (1 - p₁), while the principal inspects with probability p2 and does not inspect with probability (1-P2). Find the mixed strategy equilibrium for this game. I NI S (0, -k) (w, -w) W (w c, p-w-k)| (wc, p-w) Table 1: Payoff matrix for the inspection game
PLEASE HOW TO THINK ABOUT IT AND SOLVE
(b) Assume that utility U is a function of wealth X given by U = X.5 and that X = $1,000,000. In this part of the question, assume that the game ends if the first head has not occurred after 40 tosses of the coin. In that case, the payoff is 240 and the game is over. What is the expected payout of this game?
Refer to the accompanying game. Firm A Firm B Low Price High Price Low Price (10,9) (15,8) High Price (−10,7) (11,11) What are the secure strategies for firm A and firm B, respectively?
Suppose there are two bidders for a single object. Each bidder has a value for the object, v1 and v2, which is randomly drawn uniformly from 0 to 80. (Note that this means the probability that a value is 25 or lower is 25/80, and more generally, the probability that a value is k or lower is k/80). Bidders see their own values but not the values of their rival bidders. Consider a first price sealed bid auction where the winner of the object is the bidder who submits the highest bid and pays the price that he bid. Suppose that you are bidder 1 and you believe that your rival always bids a constant fraction α of his value. (For example, if bidder 2’ value is 15, he will bid 15α.). 1. What is your expected winning probability of the auction from any given bid b1? (Hint, you win the auction when your bid amount b1 is greater than your opponent’s bid). 2. What is your expected payoff from any given bid, b1? (You need to write your answer as a function of v1, b1, and α). 3. Compute your best…
P1| P2 Left Middle Right Left 4,2 3,3 1,2 Middle 3,3 5,5 2,6 Right 2,1 6,2 3,3 Consider the simultaneous move game represented by this payoff matrix. Suppose that the game is repeated for two periods and the players know that the game will end at the end of two periods. They observe the first period outcome before they move to the second period. Assume that there is no discounting, i.e. 2nd period payoffs are not discounted, or the discount factor is equal to 1. Which of the following outcomes could occur in some subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of this repeated game? Choose True if you think the outcome can be a SPE, otherwise choose False. a) (Left, Left) is played in both periods. b) (Right, Right) is played in both periods. c) (Middle, Middle) is played in both periods. d) (Middle, Middle) is played in the first period, followed by (Left, Left). e) (Middle, Middle) is played in the first period, followed by (Right, Right).