1. Exercise 12.1Assume that two companies (C and D) are duopolists that produce identical products. Demand for the products is given by the following linear demandfunction:P = 1,200 Qc - QDwhere Qc and QD are the quantities sold by the respective firms and P is the selling price. Total cost functions for the two companies areTCC = 25,000 + 200QcAssume that the firms act independently as in the Cournot model (i.e., each firm assumes that the other firm's output will not change).For Company C, the long-run equilibrium output isFor Company D, the long-run equilibrium output isTCD = 20,000 + 250QDAt the equilibrium output, Company C earns total profits of $and the selling price is $and the selling price is $Iand Company D earns total profits of $

There are two companies (C and D). Both produce identical products. Demand function: P = 1200 - QC -…

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Assume that two companies (C and D) are duopolists that produce identical products. Demand for the products is given by the following linear demand function: P= 1,200 Qc - QD

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Assume that two companies (A and B) are duopolists who produce identical products. Demand for the products is given by the following linear demand function: P=200− Q A − Q B where Q A and Q B are the quantities sold by the respective firms and P is the selling price. Total cost functions for the two companies are TC A =1,500+55 Q A + Q A 2 TC B =1,200+20 Q B +2 Q B 2 Assume that the firms form a cartel to act as a monopolist and maximize total industry profits (sum of Firm A and Firm B profits). In such a case, Company A will produce units and sell at . Similarly, Company B will produce units and sell at . At the optimum output levels, Company A earns total profits of and Company B earns total profits of . Therefore, the total industry profits are . At the optimum output levels, the marginal cost of Company A is and the marginal cost of Company B is . The following table shows the long-run equilibrium if the firms act independently, as in the Cournot model…
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Additional Problem 3: Assume two companies (C and D) are Cournot duopolists that produce identical products. Demand for the products is given by the following linear demand function: ? = 600 − ?C − ?D where ?C and ?D are the quantities sold by the respective firms and P is the price. Total cost functions for the two companies are ??C= 25,000 +100?C 2 ??D = 20,000 + 125?D c. Determine the equilibrium price and quantities sold by each firm. d.Determine the profits for the market as well as eachfirm.
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Assume that two companies (A and B) are duopolists who produce identical products. Demand for the products is given by the following linear demand function: P=200-QA - QB where QA and QB are the quantities sold by the respective firms and P is the selling price. Total cost functions for the two companies are TCA = 1,500 + 55QA + Q₁² Assume that the firms form a cartel to act as a monopolist and maximize total industry profits (sum of Firm A and Firm B profits). In such a case, Company A will produce units and sell at Similarly, Company B will produce At the optimum output levels, Company A earns total profits of $ total industry profits are $ At the optimum output levels, the marginal cost of Company A is $ Cournot Equilibrium Company A Company B Total Industry Selling price The following table shows the long-run equilibrium if the firms act independently, as in the Cournot model (i.e., each firm assumes that the other firm's output will not change). Total industry output Price Output…